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Preface 
Decision-making is a complex process, involving several cognitive components, in which an 
individual needs to evaluate and interpret events in order to choose between alternatives of action 
(Von Winterfeld & Edwards, 1986). To make this choice, the individual realizes a series of 
strategies and mental operations in order to process the information in her possession to achieve a 
final result (Payne, Bettman, Coupey & Johnson, 1992).  
Very often, decision-making can involve choosing between a safe and a risky option. When 
individuals prefer risky options, they implement behaviors associated with a certain probability of 
unpredictable and uncertain results. The term "uncertainty" refers to situations where the individual 
is unaware of the probability of the various outcomes that may arise from her choice (Lopes, 1983). 
Some authors (Ellsberg, 1961; Huettel, Stowe, Gordon, Warner & Platt, 2006; Platt & Huettel, 
2008) highlighted the distinction between two types of uncertainty: ‘ambiguity’, which refers to 
situations where the probabilities associated with the outcomes of a choice are unknown, and ‘risk’, 
which refers to situations where the outcomes associated with a choice are unknown, but the 
chances associated with each of them are known (Knight, 1921). 
The expression "risk propensity" is used to describe a behavioral tendency to take risky 
choices linked to a high probability of loss and therefore unpleasant results. This characteristic is 
typically assessed by tasks where subjects have to choose between a "safe" option, corresponding to 
a certain reward, and a "risky" option, corresponding to a reward that can be obtained with a certain 
degree of probability. Since the 17th century, philosophers and researchers have described models 
that predict how individuals make their decisions in uncertain situations (Platt & Huettel, 2008). 
According to the expected utility theory, individuals should choose the option with the highest 
expected utility, given the relationship between the utility of the reward and the probability of 
obtaining it. According to this model, a rational decision maker should be indifferent when 
choosing between a safe and risky option, both linked to the same outcome (Von Neumann & 
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Morgenstern, 1944). However, laboratory experiments have shown that individuals prefer to avoid 
risks, showing risk aversion (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996), 
although it is well documented that pathological gambling is a widespread phenomenon among 
adult population (Bastiani et al., 2013).  
Recently, risk propensity has been also investigated in children with the aim of detecting the 
onset of potentially risky behaviors. In situations where there is a small chance of a large loss, 
children are more likely to choose the risky option than the safe one, whereas adults behave in the 
opposite way (Harbaugh, Krause & Vesterlund 2002 ), thus indicating that risk proneness changes 
with age. This is evident since early childhood: when administering the Children's Gambling Task, 
one of the most popular gambling tasks, Kerr & Zelazo (2004) showed that four year old children 
have a better performance (in terms of more favorable choices) than three year olds. This finding, 
confirmed by other studies (Crone, Bunge, Latenstein & van der Molen, 2005; Crone & van der 
Molen, 2007; Bunch, Andrews & Halford, 2007; Gao, Wei, Bai, Lin & Li, 2009; Steelandt, 
Broihanne, Romain, Thierry & Dufour, 2013), is in line with the maturation of the orbitofrontal 
cortex and executive functions, that take place during the first years of life. 
The present research is part of a larger project, carried out in collaboration between the 
University of Rome "Sapienza" and the Institute of Science and Technology of Cognition of CNR 
in Rome. The general aim is to evaluate risk propensity in preschool and school-aged children, in 
adult humans and in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), a South-American primate species. 
Specifically, this thesis investigated risk propensity in a sample of 183 children, aged four-eight 
years old.  
The thesis is divided into four chapters: the first chapter aims to illustrate the theories 
explaining decision-making under risk and focuses in particular on the factors underlying children’s 
ability to make choices in uncertain situations; the second chapter explores the role of emotions on 
children’s risky preferences; the third chapter describes the research performed with preschoolers 
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and school-aged children aiming to elucidate the development of children’s decision-making under 
risk. Finally, in the fourth chapter the results of the research are discussed in the light of the most 
relevant literature. 
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Chapter One – Decision making under risk 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 In everyday life, individuals must constantly make decisions among multiple options, 
judging and balancing their costs and benefits, and often they do not know what consequences will 
follow from their choices, and this lack of knowledge is called uncertainty (Platt and Huettel 2008). 
Some authors distinguished two types of uncertainty, ambiguity and risk (Ellsberg 1961, Huettel et 
al. 2006, Platt and Huettel 2008). Ambiguity characterizes the situations open to several 
interpretations, in which individuals do not know which probabilities are associated with each 
choice. Instead, risk regards all the situations in which the decision maker is aware of the 
probabilities associated with each possible outcome, but the outcome remains unknown  (Knight, 
1921; Paulsen, 2012), for example, we accurately know that we have ⅙ chance of winning if 
betting on one face of a dice throw. A popular television game, Deal or No Deal,  illustrates an 
example of a situation that requires a choice between a safe and a risky option. The players have to 
choose between 20 boxes, each containing different prizes unknown to the participants. At the end 
of the game, with only two boxes left, the player has to decide if accepting the sure offer made by 
the banker, usually corresponding to the half of the larger prize left, or taking the risk to see the 
content of his own box.  How people make this kind of decision is the focus of the following 
paragraphs, in particular how children face situations which require the choice between a risky and 
a safe option. 
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1.2 Defining decision-making under risk 
How people deal with risk is a debated issue that interests scholars from different 
disciplines, from philosophers to economists, from psychologists to biologists, for centuries. In fact, 
this topic affects several fields of everyday life such as economic investments, pension investments, 
medical and long-term care insurance, and medical treatments. In particular, psychologists and 
neuroscientists are interested in risky choices because of their close relationship with gambling 
behaviour, described as an “activity that involves an element of risk or chance whereby money or a 
valued object is either won or lost” (Ladouceur et al., 2000), which is growing widely across 
different backgrounds and cultures, (O’Keeffe, 2012; Proctor 2014). Thus, it is urgent to better 
understand which factors lead to the development of this maladaptive behaviour. 
Nevertheless, it is not still clear how human beings make decisions under risk. In fact, it is a 
complex phenomenon, influenced by several factors, such as contexts, gender, personality of the 
decision maker and, moreover, it is investigated by different methods and theorical perspectives, 
which often lead to  mixed results. 
 
1.2.1 Normative models of risk: the Expected Value and the Utility Value models 
In the 17th century, the famous philosopher Blaise Pascal developed the first rational model 
of risky choice, the Expected Value Theory (EV), introducing the concept of expected value, which 
is defined as the combination of value and probability:  
EV (X) = ∑p(x) ∙ x 
where x is the outcome and p is the probability that the outcome occurs.  
 According to this model, an individual should choose the option with the highest expected 
value, when presented with a choice between two uncertain options. 
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Since this model was not applicable to the so-called St. Petersburg Paradox, discovered by 
the mathematician Nicolaus Bernoulli (1738), it was rejected. The St. Petersburg game describes a 
particular gambling activity, in which a random variable has an infinite expected value. In 
particular, the player pays a fixed entry fee and she has to bet on the toss of a coin. If the face 
chosen by the player (e.g. tails) comes up at the first toss, the game stops and the player wins only 
what she paid to play. If the head comes up, the coin is tossed again; even this time if the tails 
comes out the game ends but this time the prize is duplicated, while if head comes up again the 
player goes forward. If at the third toss tails comes up, the prize is duplicated again and so on. It is 
clear that this game can last indefinitely, so any amount of money we are willing to pay to play will 
always be too little. A rational gambler should be incline to pay any price of entry, even if this price 
can result too high for a rational player.  
In order to resolve the St. Petersburg paradox, Bernoulli introduce the concept of utility, 
defined in terms of satisfaction or “goodness”, to replace the concept of expected value(Bernoulli, 
1738). Thus, according to the Bernoulli’s model, people should choose the option with the highest 
expected utility (EU): 
 
EU (X)= ∑p(x)u ∙ x       
  
where u represents the utility of obtaining outcome x and p is the probability that outcome x occurs.   
Starting from Bernoulli's formulation, John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) 
defined an expected utility function over gambles. In their model, the utility of each outcome is 
calculated according to the probability that the decision will lead to that outcome and the utility of 
an outcome is also index of which alternatives is preferred by the decision-maker. Following von 
Neumann and Morgenstern’s studies, Leonard Savage (1954) proposed axiomatic foundations of 
the theory of subjective expected utility, that rely on decision maker’s acts and related 
11 
 
consequences (Surowik, 2002). In his work, he claimed that people’s choices can be considered the 
result of the combination of the utility function, as described above, and the subjective belief that 
there is a probability of each outcome. Thus, the option preferred by the decision-maker should be 
the one with the highest expected utility. Savage’s theory also explained why different people may 
make different decisions: in fact, they may have different utility functions or different beliefs about 
the probabilities of different outcomes, which may influence their preferences. As stated by the 
author himself, the subjective Expected Value Theory presented several limits and there are 
empirical proofs that it violates its axioms (Allais’ Paradox, Allais, 1953; Ellsberg’s Paradox, 
Ellsberg, 1961). Differently from von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory of games, which seems 
to be more applicable to games in which payments and choice strategies are known because of the 
construction of the game, Savage’s theory of subjective utility seems more suitable for decision 
problems in which a single person has to formulate his subjective convictions about payments and 
strategic intentions of his opponents (Surowik, 2002).  
In the light of the models described above, it is possible to identify different steps that lead 
an individual to make her decision. First of all, people think about all the possible outcome 
associated to the risky options; then these outcomes are seen in function of their probabilities to 
occur. At this point, it is possible to provide a measure of the value of each risky options in order to 
choose the one with the greater value (Weber 2010). However, what these models overlook is the 
importance of the context in which these decisions take place  (Weber & Johnson 2008). 
 
1.2.2 Rank-dependent utility 
Despite the models described above represent an interesting normative guide for rational 
decision making, they result inadequate to describe real behaviour; in fact, people’s decision under 
risk is far from being rational. In this scenario, non-expected utility theories consolidate their 
position; among these, worth of mention is the Rank-Dependent Expected Value Theory (RDEV), 
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proposed by Yaari and Menahem (1987) and derived by the choice model known as Rank-
Dependent Utility Model (Quiggin, 1982), in which people’s preferences depends on the rank of the 
final outcome through probability weighting. The main feature of these models is that the decision-
maker implements a transformation that subjectively weights objective probabilities. This operation 
can lead to some weighting effects, such as the inflation of small probabilities and the devaluation 
of large probabilities. The central idea of rank-dependent decision was later incorporated by Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky into the Prospect Theory, and the resulting model was referred to as 
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). In the Cumulative Prospect 
Theory, people make decisions by referring and weighing probabilities to a certain reference point 
rather than to the final outcome.  
 
1.2.3 Prospect Theory and Regret Theory  
According to a different perspective, emotions and the framing of the choice strongly 
influenced people’s decisions under risk. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) provided the most famous 
empirical evidence of the influence of the frame of choice. They asked participants to make a series 
of decisions about health treatments to prevent the spread of a new Asian disease, which could kill a 
population of 600 people. The experiment consisted of two conditions: (1) in one condition, the 
choice was between a “safe” program that would save 200 lives and a “risky” program with a 1/3 
chance of saving 600 people; (2) in the second condition, the choice was between a “safe” program 
that would cause 400 people to die and a risky one with 1/3 chance that nobody would die. 
According to the normative models, the two conditions were mathematically identical, but the 
condition affected participants’ response. They preferred the “safe”  program when they considered 
the problem in terms of saved lives (first condition), whereas they preferred the “risky” program 
when they reasoned in terms of lost lives. This result is the basis of the Prospect Theory (PT), 
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according to which humans are generally risk averse for gains, whereas they are risk prone for 
losses.  
Prospect Theory has become the most popular alternative to the Expected Utility Theory. It 
differs from Expected Utility Theory in three major ways: (a) it contemplates subjective probability 
weighting, (b) it allows a reference point defined over outcomes, and the use of different utility 
functions for gains or losses, and (c) it contemplates that the disutility of losses weighs more 
heavily than the utility of comparable gains. 
Expectations about the outcome of a choice affect the decision-maker, who will be incline 
to compare what she has achieved with what she could have achieved if she had made a different 
choice (counterfactual reasoning). Thus, a feeling of regret could emerge in the case the unchosen 
option provides a better outcome (Camille et al. 2004, Coricelli, Dolan & Sirigu, 2007). Loomes & 
Sugden (1982) and Bell (1985) proposed the Regret theory, according to which, it is the will to 
avoid an unpleasant feeling like regret to condition the choices of the decision maker. Thus, the 
authors proposed the following equation, integrating this emotion into the expected utility function:  
 
U(x,y) = v(x) + Ψ [v(x) – v(y)] 
 
The function Ψ represents the regret function, v(x) is the value of the selected option and 
v(y) is the value of the unchosen option; thus, the utility of a choice is due to the expected utility of 
the selected option and of the anticipated regret.  
These theories, the  Prospect Theory and the Regret Theory, have the value to consider both 
objective and subjective aspects of a decision, such as frame and emotions. 
 
 
 
14 
 
1.2.4 Bounded rationality 
Another position in contrast to the normative models was held by the Nobel Prize Herbert 
Simon, who criticized the assumption of normative models regarding a decision maker with full 
knowledge of a problem, infinite time to decide, and unlimited computational power to find the 
optimal solution to a decision problem. He proposed the concept of bounded rationality (1956), 
which involves both cognitive capacities and structures of the environment. In this scenario, the 
decision mechanisms cannot be universal, but domain-specific and closely linked to the 
environment in which they operate (ecological rationality, Gigerenzer & Todd, 1995). Bounded 
rationality and ecological rationality seemed to describe real decisional situations in a better way 
than the standard normative model.  
 
1.3 Risk preferences across lifespan 
I have described above the economic models that provided assumptions and theoretical 
frameworks regarding how humans should behave when facing situations that require a choice 
between a sure and a risky option. I now move to describe how this process changes during the 
child’s development.  
With the increasing availability of new legalized gambling opportunity, also children can 
engage in gambling activities created for adults. As a consequence, 3-6% of adolescents have 
serious gambling problems and another 10-15% are at risk of developing them (Derevensky, Gupta 
& Baboushkin, 2007). Thus, the ability to correctly estimate risk and to make advantageous 
decisions is essential to avoid the possible negative consequences, such as financial ruin, addiction, 
injury, and so on, caused by risky behavior, and a better understanding of the development of 
adaptive decision-making skills over the lifespan is extremely helpful in order to create 
communication programs to prevent the above problems. Unfortunately, the developmental 
trajectory of the ability to deal with risk is still not well understood.  
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The response to risk situations changes in the course of human lifespan, even if particular 
attention has been devoted to adolescents, since it was documented an increase in risk-taking 
behaviors due to the several transformations of the brain during adolescence (Byrnes, Miller & 
Schafer, 1999; Kerr and Zelazo, 2004). However, recent studies highlighted different pattern of 
response in risky situations in contrast with previous findings about  children and adolescents less 
risk averse than adults (Harbaugh et al., 2002; Levin and Hart, 2003; Levin, Weller, Pederson & 
Harshman, 2007; Burnett, Bault, Coricelli &  Blakemore, 2010; Rakow and Rahim, 2010). Paulsen 
and colleagues (2011) administered a risky choice task to young children (six- to eight-years-old), 
adolescents (15- to 16-years-old), and young adults (18- to 32-years-old), in order to describe the 
developmental trajectory of human behavior in risky situations. Participants had to face different 
kinds of decisions: i) Risk-Safe choices between a safe option and a risky one with the same 
expected value; ii) Risk-Risk choices between two risky options with different expected value; iii) 
Safe-Safe choices between two safe options. The results of this study demonstrated an age effect: 
children were risk prone when facing a choice between a safe option and a risky one, whereas adults 
were risk averse in the same condition; finally, adolescents performed at an intermediate level 
between children and adults. The risk level, that characterized the choice situation, affected risk 
proneness, depending on age. In fact, children preferred to choose risky options when the level of 
risk increased, whereas adolescents and adults acted in the opposite way. This data may be 
explained by the fact that children consider the winning probability to a greater extent than the 
losing probability, contrary to adults.  
Other studies confirmed this general pattern of a decreasing risk preference with age 
(Harbaugh et al., 2002; Levin and Hart, 2003). Weller and colleagues (2011) described the 
developmental trajectory of risk taking, from childhood through older adulthood, by testing 734 
participants (from 5 to 85 years old) with the Cups task, which consisted of 54 trials that combined 
two domains (gain/loss), three levels of probability (.20/.33/.50) and three levels of outcome 
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magnitude for the risky option (2/3/5 quarters) compared to 1 quarter for the sure option. In the gain 
domain, participants had to choose between a sure option, consisting of a winning of one quarter, 
and a risky option which provided the gain of multiple quarters or no quarters at all. In the loss 
domain, participants had to choose between a sure option, consisting of a loss of one quarter, and a 
risky option, which provided the loss of multiple quarters or no quarters. Weller and colleagues 
(2011) found an age effect depending on the domain: in fact, in the gain domain the preference for 
the risky options decreased across lifespan, whereas, it was not true in the loss domain, in which the 
preference for the risky option remained constant across ages. From these findings, it seemed that 
the sensitivity to the changes in the expected value between options increased until the elderly adult 
group, who exhibited some decline in performance. Finally, Weller and colleagues claimed that the 
ability to estimate the expected value does not appear until the mid-20s: in fact, their findings 
seemed to confirm that  children were not able to use this factor to make their decisions. 
Taken together, the above studies highlighted age-related changes in risky decision-making 
from early childhood to adulthood, but did not specifically investigate why children show a 
different decision-making behavior under risk than adults.  
 
 
1.4. How children deal with risk  
1.4.1 Age-related changes in children’s decision-making under risk  
During childhood the brain undergoes rapid transformations due to the maturation of the 
executive functions (EF), and increasing risk-taking behaviors (Kerr and Zelazo, 2004; Harms, 
Zayas, Meltzoff & Carlson, 2014). Recent findings have identified two classes of EF: (i) cool EF, 
relying on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which refers to the control of thought and action under 
neutral situations; (ii) hot EF, relying on the orbitofrontal cortex, which refers to emotionally salient 
situations (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999). 
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Recently, there has been growing interest in the ‘‘hot’’ affective aspects of EF, in particular 
during decision-making. The most widely used measure to assess affective decision-making 
involves gambling tasks, and in particular the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & 
Anderson, 1994). Kerr and Zelazo (2004) created an age-appropriate version of the Iowa Gambling 
Task, the Children’s Gambling Task (CGT), to detect age-related changes between three and four 
years of age in the development of hot EF. The material of this task consisted of two decks of 50 
cards each, that differed from each other due to the texture drawn on the surface (one was covered 
by vertical stripes, the other was in black dots on a white background). On the front side of each 
card, either happy or sad faces could appear:  the number of happy faces indicated the number of 
rewards (M&M’s) won, whereas the sad faces indicated the losses. Over trials, one deck of cards 
was advantageous, providing a net gain, and the other deck was disadvantageous, providing a net 
loss. The number of rewards won was fixed across trials, whereas the number of loss was variable. 
Twenty-four children between three and four years of age completed the task and the results 
revealed age-related changes in the ability of making advantageous choices, in fact, four year-olds 
performed better than three-year-olds, and their ability improved across trials contrary to three-year-
old children. According to the authors, this difference could be due to three possible factors: (i) 
improvement in the functionality of orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) neurons over years, useful to 
understand the different features of the decks; (ii) immaturity of the OFC of the three-year-olds, 
which caused the impossibility to develop somatic markers associated with disadvantageous 
choices; (iii) incapacity of three-year-olds to integrate two dimensions (gains and losses) to make 
their decisions. Steelandt and colleagues (2013) confirmed the general improvement of rational 
decision making between three and eight years of age, which is consistent with the development of 
EF and of different brain functions involved in decision-making. In their task, children were 
presented with six cups containing a piece of cookie. In these cups, the cookies could be bigger, 
equal or smaller than the initial piece given to children. At the beginning of the trial, the 
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experimenter showed to the child a medium-sized piece of cookie and asked her if she preferred to 
keep it or exchange it with one of those contained in the cups. If the child exchanged the initial 
item, she received the content of a random cup. According to these authors, the worse performance 
of three year-old children was due to a judgment error: they apparently summed up the content of 
all the six cups , which led to a framing effect. A framing effect refers to the impact of the frame on 
the subjective interpretation of information, and by frame we mean the form given to the 
information itself; it’s the case of a decisional situation that elicits different choices depending on 
whether we reasons in terms of gain or loss (Reyna and Ellis, 1994). This contrasts with the 
assumption of rationality, according to which preferences remain the same even if the features of a 
same option are differently described (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986).  
Reyna and Ellis (1994) investigated the origins of framing effects and how they affect 
children ability to process the information linked to risky situations. They tested 111 children (aged 
four, eight, and eleven years old) with a spinner game consisting of two blocks of nine problems 
each: one block of gain  frame problems and the other of loss frame problems, in which the level of 
reward and the level of risk were varied. The authors found that preschoolers paid attention only to 
quantitative information to make their decisions; thus, they systematically modulated their 
preferences according to the magnitude of the outcome and to the level of risk (such as in the study 
of Schlottmann and Anderson, 1994; Schlottmann, 2001; Levin and Hart, 2003; Levin et al., 2007). 
In contrast, older children showed a different response pattern, called “reverse framing”, in that they 
demonstrated greater preference for gambling in the gain than in the loss frame, contrary to adults 
tested in this type of task.  
Bunch and colleagues (2007) explained the results obtained by Kerr and Zelazo (2004) in 
terms of Complexity and Cognitive Control theory (CCC theory) and in terms of Relational 
Complexity theory (RC theory). According to the CCC theory, the improvement of the rules 
integration system occurs over time, hence the lack of ability of three year-old children to 
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coordinate the different information regarding the decks, contrary to older children. The RC theory, 
instead, is based on the different dimensions that characterized the decisional problems and on the 
relations between these dimensions, which can affect the final decisions. To test their hypothesis, 
Bunch and colleagues administered to 72 children, from three to five years old, the classical version 
of the CGT with a ternary relationship (decks, gains and losses) in addition to two less complex 
versions (involving a binary relationship), in which the decks differed only for the losses or only for 
the gains, keeping the other variable constant. The main result was that, in the ternary relationship, 
younger children chose less cards from the advantageous desk, but they performed successfully in 
the less complex version of the task. Thus, the authors addressed this result to the complexity of the 
task rather than to the lack of development of somatic marker (contrary to what reported by Kerr 
and Zelazo, 2004). The performance of four-year-old children was at an intermediate level; 
however, analyzing their individual scores, a great heterogeneity emerged. Finally, five year-old 
children demonstrated to be able to succeed even in the most complex task. Andrews and 
Moussaumai (2015) drawn the same conclusion, demonstrating the importance of the knowledge of 
the task and the training on the simpler binary relationship versions on the ability of performing 
successfully in the ternary relationship version of CGT. The importance of experience was also 
discussed by Garon and Moore (2004), which confirmed the main effect of age, by demonstrating 
that six year-olds performed better, showing a larger number of advantageous choices in the CGT, 
than the younger groups. This study also highlighted that children with greater experience in the 
task achieved an even better performance within their age groups (this evidence was further 
confirmed by the same authors later on; Garon and Moore, 2007).  
Other authors examined the role of complexity of learning the gain/loss schedule, that is, the 
ability to anticipate future outcomes (Crone et al., 2005, 2007; Gao et al., 2009), drawing the same 
results of  Kerr and Zelazo (2004) and Bunch and colleagues (2007) regarding the rapid 
development of affective decision making between three and four years of age. Crone and 
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colleagues (2005; 2007) tested children with a gambling task, the “Hungry Donkey Task” (HDT), 
which required a choice between four doors on a computer screen.  Behind each door there was a 
variable number of apples to feed a hungry donkey; children could choose to open one of the four 
doors with the goal of winning as many apples for the donkey as possible. Two doors (A and B) 
were disadvantageous over time, providing respectively frequent small losses and infrequent large 
losses; the remaining doors (C and D) were advantageous over time, yielding respectively frequent 
tiny losses and infrequent small losses. Their findings demonstrated that the frequency of 
punishments played a key role in children’s decision making under uncertainty, depending on age: 
in fact, young children chose advantageously if punishments were frequent, rather than when they 
were unpredictable and infrequent and overall, preschoolers could hardly calculate exact net gains 
and losses under uncertainty, since the punishment magnitudes were variable across trials. Thus, 
these authors claimed that the reason of poor performances in a gambling task was the insensitivity 
to future outcomes rather than the task complexity, as claimed in previous study (Bunch et al., 
2007; Andrews and Moussaunami, 2015; Garon and Moore, 2004, 2007) .  
In order to clarify developmental changes in the ability to consider both frequency of losses 
and the final outcome in decision making under risk, Aite and colleagues (2012) administered the 
Soochow Gambling Task (SGT) (that required the choice between four decks of cards, two 
disadvantageous, two advantageous) to three different groups: children from seven to nine years of 
age, adolescents of 12 and 13 years of age and adults from 18 to 32 years of age. The authors found 
that all participants preferred decks with infrequent punishments, but only adults were able to 
integrate this information about the frequency of punishments with the final outcome; furthermore, 
adults implemented the win–stay/loss–stay strategy more frequently than children and adolescents, 
when switching between decks. Children and adolescents seemed to consider only the frequency of 
the punishments to make their decisions, showing difficulties in making advantageous choices by 
preferring the decks associated with infrequent losses even if they led to a worse final outcome.  
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Analyzing the switching behavior, adults switched their choices less frequently after losses than 
children and adolescents, thus this study showed a direct connection between shifts and 
advantageous choices. The loss-stay strategy adopted by adults was interpreted by the authors as a 
tolerance to loss, which could help them to learn faster the features of each option.  
Along these lines, Mazur and Kahlbaugh (2012) examined preschoolers’ response patterns 
and strategies, comparing their performance in the Monty Hall Dilemma to those of adult humans 
and pigeons. Seventeen preschoolers, between 37 and 57 months of age, were presented with the 
Monty Hall dilemma on a laptop computer in which the bottom portion of the screen was divided 
into three “doors”. When children chose a door, a happy picture, corresponding to a winning reward 
or a unhappy picture, corresponding to a loss, could appear. There was evidence that, overall, 
preschoolers adopted a sort of strategy, although it did not turn out successful. Only 31% of the 
sample exhibited the capacity to switch throughout the experiment, the remaining participants 
adopted a constant strategy (staying or switching strategies) from the beginning to the end of the 
experiment, nevertheless the condition of the task.  
 
1.4.2 Neural bases of children’s decision-making under risk 
Age-related differences in adaptive decision making could be explained by research in 
developmental neuropsychology, which suggests that during childhood and adolescence there are 
pronounced changes in patterns of decision making associated with functional maturation of the 
prefrontal cortex, which is presumed to be the latest to mature (Luna and Sweeney, 2001). 
According to this research perspective, impaired decision making may be due to an immaturity of 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC); in fact, individuals with bilateral VMPC lesions  
demonstrated a pattern of non-adaptive decision making, taking risks without considering EV 
differences in gambling tasks (Weller, Levin & Denburg, 2011). Crone and van der Molen (2004) 
demonstrated that young children show a similar pattern of choice, in fact, as ventromedial 
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prefrontal patients seemed to be unable to anticipate future outcomes. In the following years, the 
same authors wanted to replicate their experiment with three age groups (children aged 8-10 years, 
children aged 12-14 years and adolescents aged 16-18 years), who performed the Hungry Donkey 
Task, while their heart rate and skin conductance changes were recorded (Crone and van der Molen 
2007). Analyzing these physiological aspects, it was demonstrated that, overall, heart rate slowed 
and skin conductance raised while experiencing a loss, but only the younger group (8-10 year-old 
children) failed to make advantageous choices, and this was also true for  patients with VMPFC 
damage (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1996). 
Other authors (Van Leijenhorst, Crone & Bunge,  2006; Carlson, Zayas & Guthormsen, 
2009; Paulsen, McKell Carter, Platt, Huettel & Brannon, 2012; Van Duijvenvoorde, et al., 2015) 
attempted to identify brain areas involved in the emotional and cognitive components of adaptive 
decision-making. According to these studies, the development of these areas could be at the basis of 
the risk-averse behavior. In adults, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), posterior parietal cortex (PPC), 
ventral striatum (vSTR), anterior insula and amygdala have been identified as the fundamental  
regions for understanding all the aspects that characterized the decisional problem in risky 
situations, i.e. expected  values and probabilities (reviewed in Platt and Huettel, 2008). Paulsen and 
colleagues (2012) tried to replicate their previous findings (Paulsen, Platt, Huettel & Brannon, 
2011), including a new analysis, investigating brain areas differently involved in children and adult 
decision-making. In this study, 17 children (five-eight years old), 17 adolescents (14-16 years old) 
and 16 adults (18-35 years old) were tested in a risky-decision task during functional magnetic 
resonance imaging data acquisition, that detected an increasing activation with age in some areas of 
prefrontal and parietal cortex, during decision-making under risk. Frontal regions that showed 
increasing activation with age were anterior insula, vmPFC, anterior cingulate, frontal pole, OFC, 
amygdala and hippocampus; however, considering only the safe bet trial there was not a difference 
between children and adults. Furthermore, the authors detected differences in the activation of the 
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different areas between sure bet and risky bet: during the risky bet trial the activation of anterior 
cingulate cortex, vmPFC, caudate and OFC was correlated with risk aversion, whereas the same 
result was not found in the sure bet trial. Additional knowledge about the neural areas underlying 
developmental changes in decision-making is provided by the study of van Leijenhorst and 
colleagues (2006), comparing performances of 9-12 year-olds and young adults in a gambling task, 
focusing their attention on two important dimension:  risk estimation and feedback processing.  The 
authors analyzed the activation of different brain regions regarding these two aspects of the 
decision-making: orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and midbrain for risk estimation; ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(VLPFC) and medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) for feedback processing. If it is true that these regions 
of interest showed different patterns of activation between adults and children, the same cannot be 
said if analyzing the data concerning the whole brain, which did not detected any difference 
depending on age, regarding the risk estimation and feedback processing For both risk anticipation 
and negative feedback processing, ACC and lateral OFC were more engaged in children than in 
adults, demonstrating that children had more difficulties to make their decision under risk than 
adults. The different activation of the brain regions involved, in particular the lateral OFC and ACC, 
provides new evidence in favor of the important role that these different processes play in the 
development of decision-making over childhood.  
So far, from neuropsychological data it seems that children perform gambling tasks similarly 
to patients with VMPC lesions; in this scenario, the only exception is represented by the study of 
Carlson and colleagues (2009). They investigated individual differences in affective decision-
making, by taking into account another electrophysiological correlate of children’s performance on 
a gambling task (HDT), the Event Related Potential (ERP). Specifically, they considered the P300 
component (which is the focus of the analysis of feedback effects) and SPN, i.e., the stimulus-
preceding negativity (which is sensitive to reward or punishment properties of an anticipated 
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outcome). They found that children had difficulty in making advantageous decisions, as expected 
(Crone and van der Molen, 2004, 2007; Crone et al., 2005), but contrary to their previous study 
(Crone and van der Molen, 2007) they noticed that 8-year-old participants improved their 
performance across trials. Despite this improvement, children’s choices were influenced by 
information about the frequency of punishments (in line with previously discussed research): they 
significantly preferred the infrequent-punishment options, contrary to adult VMPFC patients, who 
chose most often the disadvantageous options, which yielded to the larger immediate rewards.  
A recent study (van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2015) is worth of particular mention for its 
original approach to the investigation of the processes underlying risky choices over development, 
by applying a risk-return model to the risky choices of children, adolescents and adults in a fMRI-
compatible version of the Columbia Card Task (CCT). According to the authors “this approach 
allowed to decompose risky decisions into their constituent features, to isolate and identify which of 
them, in particular, drives the decisions of children and adolescents at the behavioral level, and to 
understand how the developing brain is involved in this process”. Eight 11 year-old children, 16–19 
year-old adolescents, and 25–34 year-old adults were presented with fMRI-adjusted version of the 
CCT, that consisted of several trials, which required a series of decisions about turning over cards 
(that could provide both losses or gains). The task ended when the participant decided to stop 
turning over cards or she turned over a loss card, which led to reset her amount. In different trials, 
the probability and amounts of gain and loss were manipulated. In addition, the participants were 
required to accomplish the behavioral risk–return decomposition, that estimated the expected value 
and the effect of risk on the decision to take or to stop taking a card. Furthermore, imaging 
acquisition was registered across trials. At the neural level, there were noted activations in the 
thalamus, anterior insula, dmPFC, and lateral PFC, corresponding to changes in risky behavior. In 
addition, van Duijvenvoorde and colleagues (2015) highlighted substantial differences between 
individuals, particularly children and adolescents, confirming  some previous evidences regarding a 
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peak in early or late adolescent risk taking (Burnett et al., 2010), in contrast with other authors that 
observed decreasing risk-taking levels from childhood to adulthood (Levin and Hart, 2003; Levin et 
al., 2007). This finding, and the multidisciplinary approach proposed by van Duijvenvoorde and 
colleagues (2015), could provide the basis for future studies on the development of risky decision 
making.  
 
1.4.3. Cognitive components underlying children’s risk propensity 
All the above studies considered the age-related changes in decision-making under risk as a 
general index of both the maturation of executive functions and the development of decision-
making neural circuits that occur in the preschool years. Nevertheless, it is still unclear which are 
the cognitive components that may affect the development of risk propensity. Recently, some 
authors tried to address this issue by focusing on several cognitive structures, such as working 
memory, inhibitory control and attentive processes (Garon and Moore, 2007; Heilman, Miu & 
Benga, 2009; Smith, Xiao & Bechara, 2012; Van Dujvenvoorde, Jansen,  Bredman & Huizenga, 
2012; Mata, Sallum, Miranda, Bechara, Malloy-Diniz, 2013; Beitz, Salthouse, Davis, 2014; Harms 
et al., 2014; Audusseau & Juhel, 2015). All these studies confirmed the rapid development in 
affective decision-making between three and four years of age, but not all authors agree on which 
cognitive components underlie this process.  
Garon and Moore (2007) found developmental changes in future-oriented decision making 
from 3.5 to 4.5 years of age in a gambling task and in a delay of gratification task. These authors 
found a correlation between the performances in the two tasks only for 3.5-year-old children. These 
children, contrary to the 4.5-year-olds, needed reminders about the features of each decks, perhaps 
due to a limitation in working memory. However, when they received this information, they 
performed similar to 4.5 year-olds.  
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Memory was considered an important factor in the developmental improvement of 
advantageous decision-making by other authors as Hongwanishkul and colleagues (2005), Van 
Duijvenvoorde and colleagues (2012) and Audusseau and Juhel (2015). In a wider study about the 
development of executive functions, Hongwanishkul and colleagues (2005) administered to 98 
children, from 3 to 5.9 years of age, several tasks to assess the cool and hot aspects of the executive 
functions. Their results confirmed the rapid changes during the preschool years in both hot and cool 
aspects; moreover, there was a positive correlation between performance in a memory task, The 
Self-Ordered Pointed task (SOPT) (Petrides and Milner, 1982), and in the CGT.  
Van Duijvenvoorde and colleagues (2012) compared decision making between a standard, 
non-informed condition and a new, informed condition, in which explicit information on the choice 
properties was presented. Two hundred and ninety-three children (ages 7–9, ages 9–11, and ages 
11–13), adolescents (ages 12–14 and 14–17), and young adults (ages 18–29) were presented with a 
modified version of the Iowa Gambling Task, in two versions: (i) a non-informed condition, in 
which no information on the choice properties was presented, and (ii) an informed condition, in 
which all the information about gains, losses and probabilities was given to the participants.  The 
results showed that decreasing the load on long-term and working memory highly influenced 
children’s ability to decide advantageously; in fact, children’s advantageous choices significantly 
improved in the informed compared to the non-informed condition. This finding indicated that both 
long-term memory and working memory are important factors underlying the development of 
advantageous decision making. However, it is important to note that other processes, such as 
inhibitory control (as described by Heilman et al., 2009), not only long-term and working memory, 
could intervene in this kind of situations. 
Audusseau and Juhel (2015) drew the same conclusions: the efficiency of children’s 
working memory is a prerequisite for making advantageous choices in uncertain situations. In their 
study, participants were required to complete two tasks: the CGT (Kerr and Zelazo, 2004) and The 
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Self-Ordered Pointed task (SOPT) (Petrides and Milner, 1982) to measure the efficiency of 
executive working memory. The results showed that the acquisition speed was inferior for the 
participants, who had to carry out a secondary task in addition to the CGT, compared to the control 
group, and overall, children who completed the secondary task performed lower than participants 
tested in the control condition. Furthermore, children who showed a higher efficiency in working 
memory were the ones who acquired more rapidly an adaptive choice behavior. The speed of 
acquisition of the adaptive choice behavior depended on children’s age group: older groups showed 
a significantly higher speed of acquisition compared to the younger ones. Finally, age affected also 
the entire performance, in fact, younger children were less likely to choose from the advantageous 
deck than the older children.  
In the attempt of examining the effects of cognitive processes (i.e., shifting, inhibition, 
working memory, fluid reasoning, processing speed, language, intelligence, attentive processes) on 
decision-making under risk, different authors (Heilman et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2012; Mata et al., 
2013; Beitz et al., 2014; Harms et al., 2014) provided evidence in contrast to the findings reported 
above. In addition to a gambling task, these authors administered batteries of tests to participants, 
including the Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices Test (Raven, Raven and Court 1998) and the 
Repetition and Comprehension of Instructions subtests from the Romanian version of NEPSY 
(Korkman, Kirk & Kamp 1998) to assess inductive reasoning, working memory and language 
development (in Heilman et al., 2009), the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler 
1999), the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Grant & Berg 1948) to assess set shifting, the TMT-B 
(Reitan 1971) to measure speed of processing and attention, the above-mentioned SOPT (Petrides & 
Milner 1982) to assess the capacity for response inhibition and working memory load, the Conner’s 
Continuous Performance Test (Conners, 2002), a go/no go task used to measure motor 
inhibition/impulsivity and sustained attention (in Smith et al., 2012), the Columbia Mental Maturity 
Scale (Burgemeister, Blum & Lorge 1972) to assess the general reasoning ability (in Mata et al., 
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2013), the Attention Network Task (McCandliss, Sommer, Raz & Posner 2002) to evaluate the 
efficiency and independence of attentional networks, the Dimensional Change Cart Sort (Kirkham, 
Cruess & Diamond 2003) to measure set shifting (in Harms et al., 2014), the Matrix Reasoning, a 
shortened version of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Third Edition (Wechsler, 1997), the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, the classical Stroop Task (Stroop, 1935), and the N-back Task 
(Kirchner 1958) to assess working memory updating (in Beitz et al., 2014).  
All these studies confirmed previous findings about the improvement of decision-making in 
risky situations during development, but none of them found any correlation between the measures 
evaluated and the performance on the gambling task. Among these studies, the work by Beitz and 
colleagues (2014) is especially interesting for its attempt to describe differences in affective 
decision-making throughout lifespan, from five to 89 years of age. The results of this study 
confirmed that IGT performance increased from childhood to adulthood and underwent a decline in 
old age. Moreover, children showed different pattern of response compared to adolescents and 
adults: (i) children and adolescents seemed to be more impulsive than adults; in fact the latter 
demonstrated to be able to consider both loss and gains to make their choices; (ii) children preferred 
high net outcome less than young and middle-aged adults and low frequency decks less than 
middle-aged and older adults. Finally, the results of this study were in contrast to the already 
discussed study by Bunch and colleagues (2007), in fact, Beitz and colleagues (2014) did not 
attribute the same importance to the loss frequency regarding children’s preferences in risky 
situations.  
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1.4.4. Expected value and probability understanding in risky situations 
The expected value (i.e., the product between the amount of an option and the probability of 
getting it) and probability understanding are prerogatives to deal with risky decisions and it is still 
debated by researchers when these abilities emerge in the human development and whether a poor 
performance on gambling tasks may be due to a lack of understanding of the above aspects (as 
claimed by Steelandt et al., 2013). To date, the scenario seems heterogeneous and full of contrasting 
elements. Schlottmann and Anderson (1994) and Schlottmann (2001) provided evidence in favor of 
a functional understanding of probability and expected value in young children. Schlottmann and 
Anderson (1994) tested the understanding of the concept of expected value with a Roulette Type 
Spinner game, which provided a reward only if the spinner stopped on the red sector of a circular 
disk. To accomplish this type of task, the use of a multiplication rule was necessary, in order to 
integrate probability and value of the reward. However, this rule is not expected to emerge before 7 
or 8 years of age, therefore younger children have to implement different strategies to make their 
decisions. In addition, the authors proposed a more complex version of this task, called the two-
prize game, in which two different prizes were foreseen for both red and blue sectors, increasing the 
difficulty to integrate the probability and the value for each outcome.  
Schlottmann and Anderson (1994) found a clear evidence of an understanding of the 
expected value and probabilistic foundations by the age of eight years old; nevertheless, the 
youngest children showed the ability to consider both prize and probability to make their choices. 
To sum up, the authors claimed that children are able to reason in a probabilistic way, in particular, 
in their study, the three older age groups followed the multiplication rule, whereas the younger 
children used an addition rule to complete task. In 2001, Schlottmann confirmed her previous 
results, contributing to the growing evidence for children’s intuitive reasoning competence.  
A year later, Harbaugh and colleagues (2002) tried to explain the risk attitude in terms of the 
Cumulative Prospect Theory, according to which the value of a gamble is determined by  
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individually weighted probabilities and values. Assuming that people tend to be risk-averse for gain 
and risk-prone for losses, Harbaugh and colleagues (2002) investigated how people react to 
variation of probability. Participants from age five to 64 were presented 14 free choices between a 
simple gamble and a certain outcome with real and salient payoff (tokens for children, which could 
be used to buy toys and games, and money for teenagers and adults). The experimenter gave 
children 50 tokens and told them that they could lose or win some during the task, by choosing a 
series of cards, with the probabilities for the gamble depicted on them. Participants, and especially 
children, deviated from the Cumulative Prospect Theory model and their risky choices increased 
with probability of winning and decreased with probability of losing, compared to adults. These 
findings demonstrate that children clearly used probability weights to make their decisions.  
The above studies showed that children as young as four years of age are able to make 
inferences on basic probabilistic reasoning problems and are capable of engaging in probability 
calculations in simple tasks. In this scenario, a study by Denison and Xu (2014) is worth of a 
special mention: they aimed to evaluate if even infants under one year of age are able to use 
probabilities to guide their action and reach their targets. They tested 24 10- to 12-month-old infants 
in four experiments, in which participants were shown an attractive object and an unattractive one; 
to assess infant’s favorite object, the authors noted the first one to which the infant crawled. These 
object were contained in jars, which were covered while the experimenter randomly removed one 
object from each jar, hidden from infant eyes. The goal of this task was to evaluate if infants were 
able to understand which jar was more likely to provide the favorite object. Four experiments were 
performed. In Experiment 1, infants saw populations of 12 attractive to four unattractive objects 
versus 12 attractive to 36 unattractive objects, so there was an equal number of attractive objects in 
each population, but a different probability of obtaining them. In Experiment 2, attractive objects 
were more numerous in the less probable population. In Experiment 3, the authors investigated the 
heuristic used by children to make their inferences, analyzing how they consider the quantity of the 
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unattractive objects compared to the proportions of attractive objects. In this experiment, infants 
had to choose between a sample from one of two populations with three types of objects: attractive, 
unattractive and neutral. Finally, Experiment 4 tested the level of sophistication in infants’ 
probability reasoning, by proposing two jars, one containing a  population of 60 attractive and 15 
neutral objects and the other containing  population of 60 attractive and 40 neutral objects. Overall, 
the results of the four experiments showed that infants (i) used proportions to predict outcome of 
random event, (ii) were able to use proportions of attractive objects to guide their prediction and 
action, (iii) attempted to obtain a preferred object, rather than to avoid a not-preferred object, and, 
finally, (iv) provided evidence for probabilistic reasoning based on proportions, by searching the 
favorite object in the sample from the 60:15 population, and not in the sample from the largest 
population. Overall, this study highlight important abilities of infants below 12 months of age to 
make rudimental probabilistic inference to fulfil their goals even in uncertain situations.  
Contrary to previous findings (Schlottmann and Anderson,1994; Schlottmann, 2001), Levin 
and colleagues (2007) showed that young children (aged five to seven years old) were significantly 
less responsive to expected value differences than their parents and older children (aged eight to 11 
years old), by making more risky choices when they were disadvantageous. In this study, the 
youngest age group was less able to consider EV differences between the options than adults, both 
in gain and loss domains. Although earlier studies (Harbaugh et al., 2002; Schlottmann and 
Anderson, 1994; Schlottmann, 2001) demonstrated that young children could consider both 
probability and outcome information in making risky choices, Levin and colleagues (2007) 
demonstrated that children were not able to make advantageous choices due to their inability to 
understand changes in probability.  
 
1.4.5 Gender differences in children’s decision-making in risky situations 
The pioneering study by Slovic (1966) aimed to identify gender differences on children's 
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risky decision-making task. The task, proposed to children, consisted in a panel of 10 small 
switches, nine of which were "safe", providing one spoonful of M&M’s candies, whereas the tenth 
was a "disaster" switch, which could cause the loss of all the candies already won. Children (1047 
volunteer participants, aged six to 16) were asked to pull one of the switches and to decide whether 
to pull another switch or to stop and keep the rewards earned. The results showed a significant 
difference between girls and boys by the age of 11, when girls seemed to be more cautious than 
boys, and performed better by making more advantageous choices than boys. However, this study 
had one severe limitation about participants, who were only those children who volunteered to play 
a risk-taking game, although it had the merit to introduce the debate on gender influences on 
children’s decisions.  
Garon and Moore (2004) showed a better performance in female children: in their study, 
female participants (three-four-six years old) chose more frequently from the advantageous decks 
and were more aware of the task than their male peers; thus, they seemed driven by a conscious 
knowledge and were more sensitive to frequent loss phenomena than males, as in Carlson and 
colleagues (2009) and van Duijevenvoorde and colleagues (2012). Bunch and colleagues (2007) 
and Heilman and colleagues (2009) found the same better performance of female children only 
when they were  three-years old. In contrast, Gao and colleagues (2009) found a better performance 
of male children (three-four-five years old) in terms of more advantageous choices. This result is 
consistent with previous findings obtained by Kerr and Zelazo (2004), Crone and colleagues (2005) 
and Crone and van der Molen (2007). Finally, Aite and colleagues (2012) and Mata and colleagues 
(2013) did not reveal any significant gender differences in affective decision-making tasks.  
 
 
1.4.6. Children’s decision-making under risk in clinical populations 
Clinical studies on children’s decision-making has mainly focused on attention deficit and 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) populations. ADHD is a severe developmental disorder, 
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characterized by a persistent pattern of inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that negatively 
impacts on social, academic or occupational functioning (DSM-V, 2013). It is also defined by an 
abnormal sensitivity to reinforcement and a diminished sensitivity to negative outcomes. On these 
basis, some authors (Geurts, van der Oord & Crone, 2006; Garon, Moore & Waschbusch, 2006;  
Luman, Oosterlaan, Knol & Sergeant, 2008; Masunami, Okazaki & Maekawa, 2009; Gong et al., 
2014) tried to identify differences between ADHD children and typically developing children in 
tasks requiring decision-making in uncertain situations. Assuming that children with ADHD have 
less sensitivity to unfavorable outcomes, they prefer immediate gratification and they have high 
sensitivity to rewards, then they should choose more the disadvantageous option than the 
advantageous one, compared to the control groups, and their decisions should be guided by the 
rewards’ information.   
Overall, with the only exception of the study by Geurts and colleagues (2006), children with 
ADHD are less sensitive to rewards and punishments, which lead them to implement dysfunctional 
decision making strategies (Masunami et al., 2009). In particular, when the magnitude and 
frequency of rewards and punishments were manipulated, ADHD children presented different 
patterns of response than control peers. Luman and colleagues (2008) proved that ADHD children 
paid more attention to the frequency of the punishments rather than their magnitude and the future 
consequences of their choices. Overall, all sample, control group and ADHD children, improved its 
performance throughout the task. These authors also examined heart rate (HR) and skin 
conductance (SC) responses to reinforcement, to detect whether impaired decision-making may be 
explained by different psychophysiological responses to penalty and rewards. The results showed 
that ADHD children exhibited a dysfunctional SC patterns and their HR accelerated more than in 
controls following a reinforcement.  
In contrast, Geurts and colleagues (2006) did not find any difference between children with 
ADHD and typically developing children in response strategy and reward sensitivity during 
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decision-making. In this study, all children improved their ability to make advantageous choices 
during the task and this capacity was evident in the reversed version of the Hungry Donkey task, in 
which children received only punishments in the first two trials, which allowed children  to 
discriminate the options faster  than in the classical version. Considering the frequency, children 
seemed to make more advantageous choices when the punishments and the rewards were more 
frequent. In the classic version of the task, all children preferred the options associated with 
infrequent punishments even if larger, whereas on the reversed task they chose more the options 
associated with more frequent, but small, rewards. The only difference between the two groups 
concerned the number of switches in the standard gambling task, in which ADHD children made 
less switches than controls. Furthermore, Geurts and colleagues (2006) did not find any correlation 
between ADHD children’s performance in this task and inhibitory control deficits, which is 
consistent with previously described studies (Heilman et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2012; Mata et al., 
2013; Harms et al., 2014; Beitz et al., 2014). Within the ADHD population some differences were 
found: (i) ADHD children with anxiety/depression show the same pattern of response of typically 
developing children; (ii) ADHD-alone children demonstrated impaired performances, no form of 
improvement and had lower awareness of the game (evaluated by an awareness test, consisting in 
four questions about the features of the decks) than control children and ADHD-anxiety/depression 
groups. The authors addressed this result to two possible reason: (i) more responsiveness to loss by 
children with internalizing disorders; (ii) high level of anxiety could help children to discriminate 
faster which decks were advantageous or disadvantageous (Garon et al., 2006; Masunami et al., 
2009).  
Gong and colleagues (2014) investigated, for the first time, two brain signals, Feedback-
Related Negativity (FRN) and Late Positive Potential (LPP) depending on the effect of reward or 
punishment and punishment magnitude (small vs. large). The participants were divided in three 
groups: ADHD-Combined (ADHD-C) and ADHD-Inattentive (ADHD-I), and typically developing 
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children (TD), and they all completed the Children’s Gambling Task. This study revealed that the 
FRN signal increased in case of large losses compared to small losses and gains, only in TD and 
ADHD-C children, but not ADHD-I children. This result demonstrated that these children were 
highly influenced by external negative feedbacks. Furthermore, TD and ADHD-C children shared 
another characteristic: in fact, they resulted more sensitive to the punishments and their magnitude 
than the ADHD-I children.  
 
1.5 Conclusion 
From the above literature review it emerges that different authors approached the study of 
the mechanisms underlying risk propensity by using different methodologies, often achieving 
conflicting results and diverging conclusions. Thus, the analysis of the literature carried out in the 
previous paragraphs does not provide definitive answers to all questions, but it stresses two key 
points in the study of human decision making under risk: (i) risk propensity is not a stable trait, but 
evolves from childhood to adulthood, (ii) the maturation of executive functions and emotional 
regulation may decrease risk-taking behaviors.  
The above findings suggest that the construct of risk propensity is multifaceted and multi-
determined and thus it is impossible to pinpoint a single factor as the causal factor. Moreover, the 
mechanisms underlying this construct are not yet well defined, given the multiplicity of theoretical 
and methodological approaches that have tried to answer this question.  
The above heterogeneous scenario and the difficulty in the interpretation of the empirical 
data reviewed are partly due to the lack of a general theoretical account to which the various studies 
can refer, since different theorists provided different models of decision-making under uncertainty 
(see paragraph 1.2), and it is still unclear which one is the most suitable to describe this process. 
The classical duality between the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and the Prospect Theory (PT) 
must be overcome in favor of a model that allows the co-existence of the different theories, in order 
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to explain the heterogeneity in responses and to identify which people behave according to what 
theory and in which circumstances. Harrison and Rutstrom (2009) satisfied this need, by proposing 
a mixed model which permits the co-existence of each theory.  
These authors demonstrated that both theories, EUT and PT, contribute to the decision 
process,  thus, it is impossible to identify the factors, of one or the other theory, that characterize the 
choice behavior under risk. This statistical framework could represent the potential bridge between 
economy and psychology, and to prove that, Andersen and colleagues (2010) proposed the SP/A 
model. The SP part is referred to the process implemented by the decision-maker of evaluating the 
security and the potential of a lottery, which is identical to the RDEV principle reviewed earlier (see 
paragraph 1.2.2). In contrast, the A part regards the “aspirations” of the agent of the choice.  
Applying this conceptualization to the famous game show Deal or no Deal, Andersen and 
colleagues (2006) demonstrated which components of the model explained participants’ responses 
(the A part was predominant over the SP part) and their trend during the game, according to 
different game situations. In 2008, Andersen and colleagues replicated their results, carrying 
evidence in favor of a greater weight attributed to the A criterion and, at the same time, of the 
implementation of both parts.  
In light of this new theoretical and statistical structure, the studies reported above could be 
reviewed and replicated.  
The empirical data reviewed in the previous paragraphs have the undeniable value to shed 
light on the development and on the difficulties to study risk propensity in children. However, this 
argument remains an open issue and, for this reason, it is important to continue to explore this topic 
from early childhood in order to understand the ontogeny of human decision-making. All the open 
questions could represent the basis for future research, hopefully guided by a unique theoretical 
structure, which takes into account the various theories without considering them in opposition to 
each other, with the final aim of identifying the latent processes of decision-making under risk and 
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achieving solid results. 
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Chapter Two - Emotional aspects of risky decision-
making 
 
2.1 The role of emotions in the decision-making 
Traditionally, in the research on risk proneness, several authors focused their attention on 
the cognitive components, that drive and influence individual choices in contexts where individuals 
are asked to choose between a safe and a risky option, neglecting the role that emotions play in this 
process. However, the relationship between emotion and decision-making in risky contexts is not 
negligible and it can be investigated according to two different perspectives. As Schwarz (2000) 
states, the relationship between decision-making and emotion is pre-eminent and bi-directional: the 
positive or negative outcome of a decision can profoundly affect the feelings of the decision-maker 
and his ability to choose. 
Some researchers analyzed how emotional reactions to past experiences influence the 
occurrence of potentially risky behaviors (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio & Lee, 1999; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 2005; Damasio, 1994). According to 
these authors, the risk of carrying out potentially harmful behaviors is higher in individuals who 
have previously experienced positive emotions following a choice with an uncertain outcome than 
those who, in the same situation, have experienced negative emotions. Damasio (1994) and Bechara 
and colleagues (1999; 2000) proposed the somatic marker hypothesis to support the idea that the 
positive or negative consequences, experienced in the past, affect decision-making in risky 
situations. According to this hypothesis, the inability to recall the emotions experienced in the past 
determines the incapability to make favorable choices in risky conditions. Bechara and colleagues 
(1994; 1999; 2000; 2005) tested this hypothesis by using the experimental protocol of the "Iowa 
Gambling Task".  
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The results of this experiment showed that the control group of adult participants preferred 
the advantageous decks, probably driven by negative emotions resulting from the large losses 
associated with the choice of risky cards. Conversely, participants with injuries in the brain areas 
underlying emotional processes (amygdala and prefrontal ventromedial cortex), significantly 
preferred cards of the disadvantageous deck. The fact that the latter did not have cognitive deficits 
and were, from this point of view, quite similar to the participants of the control group, supported 
the hypothesis that emotional processes underlie risky decisions. 
The second research perspective investigates the role of emotional dysregulation, with 
particular reference to high levels of impulsivity and anger, in taking on risky behaviors (Cauffman 
& Steinberg, 2000; Cooper, Wood, Orcutt & Albino, 2003; Eisenberg et al., 2001; Silk, Steinberg, 
& Morris, 2003; Steinberg & Scott, 2003). The focus of these authors is often on the relationship 
between emotional regulation and impulsivity, defined as the inability to inhibit a dominant 
response while pursuing a cognitively relevant goal (Rothbart & Bates, 1998). It was observed that 
children with more inhibitory and self-control abilities seem to become adolescents and adults with 
high social and academic skills, capable of delaying gratification and tolerating frustrations 
(Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Mischel & Mischel, 1983; Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988; Mischel, 
Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989; Sethi, Mischel, Aber, Shoda & Rodriguez, 2000); on the contrary, high 
levels of impulsivity are associated with risky behaviors, external behavioral disorders and 
antisocial behavior (Miller & Byrnes, 1997; Eisenberg et al., 2001; Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000; 
Steinberg, 2004; Cooper, Agocha & Sheldon, 2000; Cooper et al., 2003). In this scenario, Cooper 
and colleagues (2000; 2003) tried to create a bridge between the two above-mentioned research 
perspectives. Through self-report questionnaires administered to 1666 young adults between the 
ages of 18 and 25, these authors demonstrated that the desire to avoid negative emotions 
experienced in the past, as well as impulsivity and personality factors, such as extroversion and 
neuroticism, are involved in decision-making in risk situations.  
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2.3 Social and emotional influences on children’s decision making under risk 
In adult humans, decisions under risk are affected by several external and internal factors, 
such as the context of the choice and the emotions associated with decisions, but it is still not clear 
which are the situational and dispositional characteristics that may predict and affect children’s 
behavior.  
Miller and Byrnes (1997) tested the self-regulation model (SRM) of risk taking. According 
to SRM, the factors associated with a risk-taking behavior were overconfidence, impulsivity, peer 
influences and insensitivity to outcomes. In their study, the authors performed two experiments, to 
evaluate the effect of different factors on children’s decision-making under risk. In the first 
experiment, they manipulated two contextual factors (presence versus absence of peers and content 
of the task: one task involved math and physical skills, whereas the other involved probability) and 
examined the role of six personal factors (age, gender, impulsivity, self-sufficiency, fear of failure, 
child’s assessment of her own ability). Usually, these factors have different weights according to 
age and gender. Regarding gender, some differences emerged: boys, in the peer-absent condition, 
showed greater risk taking correlated with higher impulsivity and lower anxiety, whereas girls, in 
the same condition, resulted less impulsive and more reflective, and, overall, peers’ presence 
influenced children’s choices. Furthermore, boys who were more self-sufficient took more risks, 
contrary to girls. In the second experiment, children were given four new skill tasks (spelling, 
basketball, and two social skill tasks) and two new probabilistic tasks, and, again, the effects of 
gender and age were investigated. In addition, the authors examined the role of other factors, that 
could be possibly correlated with risk taking: interest, beliefs about the desirability of success on a 
task, beliefs about the aversion to failure on a task, and the role of sensation seeking. In this second 
experiment, the only difference emerged in the basketball and dice tasks, in which boys performed 
better than girls; in the other cases, this gender difference was not significant. For the probabilistic 
tasks, an age-related difference emerged: 11-12 year-old children selected the riskiest option more  
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than the 9-10 year-olds. The risky preferences were significant correlated with some personal traits 
measured in the skill tasks, such as higher ratings of ability, competitiveness, interest in thrill and 
adventure seeking, whereas these correlations were not so strong in the two probabilistic tasks. 
Furthermore, interests and ability beliefs resulted correlated with each other, as well as being 
correlated with risk-taking. In summary, this study revealed that gender, ability beliefs, interest, 
thrill, adventure seeking, and peer presence were significant predictors of risk taking, demonstrating 
that this is a multifaceted construct that cannot be explained by a single factor.  
A longitudinal study of Levin and colleagues (2007) has contributed to increasing the 
knowledge about the role of situational factors and has helped to individuate what personal 
characteristics may predict and reveal decision-making processes over development. Participants 
were child–parent pairs (children were six-eight years old) who performed the risky decision-
making task described by Levin and Hart (2003). In this previous study, (i) children were more risk 
prone than their parents, (ii) both children and parents preferred the risky option to avoid losses than 
to get gains, (iii) children were more risk prone if their parents were too, (iv) personality traits, such 
as shyness and impulsivity, could predict children’s decision-making under risk. Based on these 
results, Levin and colleagues (2007) tested the same children, aged 9–11 years old, and their parents 
in the same risky decision-making task to evaluate the stability of their decisions. Longitudinal data 
revealed that children were more risk prone than adults, as previous findings, and,  the data detected 
in the first experiment resulted predictive of the choice behavior expressed three years later. The 
results of this study are important to understand which characteristics could predict and affect 
choices and to lay the basis for future research aimed at investigating which components of 
decision-making emerge at an early age. 
Vitaro and Wanner (2011) investigated whether low anxiety/low inhibitory control could 
predict early engagement in gambling activities more than disinhibition/high impulsivity. In 
addition, the authors evaluated the role of parent gambling on their children’s risk taking behavior. 
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Participants in this study were children aged six, seven and eight years old, who were tested 
again when they were 10 years old, their parents and teachers. Children completed a self-report 
questionnaire to assess their involvement in gambling problems and K – ABC by Cahan and 
Noyman (2001), an intelligence test. Parents were administrated the South Oaks Gambling Screen 
by Lesieur and Blume (1987), which investigated their participation in gambling activities. Finally, 
teachers were administered the Child Social Behavior Questionnaire by Tremblay, Vitaro, Gagnon, 
Piche´ and Royer (1991) in order to measure anxiety and impulsivity of their pupils. Results 
showed that impulsivity predict early gambling already by the age of 10 for both genders, whereas a 
low level of anxiety predicted early gambling, but only in boys. The authors found interesting 
results about the lack of a link between anxiety and impulsivity, and, surprisingly, they did not 
found a correlation between parents’ gambling and children’s involvement in gambling activities, 
neither an interaction with children’s dispositional traits. Although in this study only impulsivity 
and anxiety are taken into account as dimensions affecting risky decision making (ignoring other 
possible relevant variables), and it has been used only an abbreviated scale to assess parent 
gambling problems, these findings are important for promoting prevention programs focusing on 
children’s personal dispositions and parent gambling.  
Some authors (O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney, 2012; Weisberg and Beck, 2011; 
O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney, 2014; O’Connor, McCormack, Beck & Feeney, 2015) 
investigated how experiencing regret affects and leads children to adaptive decision-making in 
uncertainty situations. O’Connor and colleagues (2012) presented children (four to nine years old) 
with a choice between two boxes in two conditions: (i) in regret trials, children always received the 
less attractive prize, (ii) in the baseline trial, both prizes were equally attractive. After receiving the 
prize, children had to rate their feelings on a 5-point scale, then they saw the alternative prize in the 
unchosen box, and they had to express again whether they felt happier, sadder or neutral about their 
choice. Results showed that by the age of six, children expressed to feel sadder in regret trials, thus 
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this was interpreted as evidence of the feeling of regret from this age.  
To test implications of this emotion for children’s decision-making, O’Connor and 
colleagues (2014) gave children (five-seven-nine years old) the same box choice task and then 
returned the next day to present children with the same choices. According to the authors, children 
who experienced regret on Day 1 should change their choices on Day 2, and furthermore the 
authors considered adaptive decision makers those children who were inclined to pay a small cost to 
switch their choices on Day 2, but not in baseline trials. Results showed that children who 
experienced regret on Day 1 were significantly more likely to switch on Day 2; thus, the authors 
concluded that the experience of regret led to better decision making in this task.  
In a study of regret using a similar box choice task, Weisberg and Beck (2011) argued that 
the experience of regret should be affected by the level of responsibility for the outcome. In this 
study, the outcome was determined by the child’s choice or the roll of a dice. The results indicated 
that six- and seven-year-old children experienced regret when they received unfavorable outcomes 
following their choice, rather than following the roll of a dice. Both O’Connor and colleagues 
(2014) and Weisberg and Beck (2011) did not examine the impact of other children’s negative 
emotions, such as frustration, on decision making, which may have the same association with 
decision making as regret. O’Connor and colleagues (2014) claimed that the experience of regret 
directly affected children’s subsequent decisions; however, other authors asserted that predicting 
future regret and trying to avoid it (i.e., anticipating regret), rather than its experience, was the real 
mechanism underlying adaptive decision-making.  
This hypothesis was tested first by Guttentag and Ferrell (2008) and then by McCormack 
and Feeney (2015). In their studies children were told that they had to choose between three boxes; 
inside each box there could be a good reward, a medium reward or nothing (although all three boxes 
provided a medium reward). Then, the experimenter removed one of the boxes, and children had to 
choose between the two remaining boxes. After receiving the medium reward, containing in the 
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chosen box, children were asked to express their feeling on a 5-point scale and then to predict how 
they would feel if the larger reward was in the unchosen box. Children were able to accurately 
predict that they would feel sadder by the age of eight years, contrary to the evidence provided by 
O’Connor and colleagues (2012), in which nearly all six- and seven-year-olds experienced regret. 
Thus, there was a delay of at least one year between experience and anticipation of regret. With the 
purpose of integrating these evidences, O’Connor and colleagues (2015) administrated the 
experienced regret task on Day 1 (Weisberg and Beck, 2011), the choice switching task on Day 2 
(O’Connor et al., 2014), and then the anticipated regret task (Guttentag & Ferrell, 2008; 
McCormack & Feeney, 2015). The authors replicated O’Connor and colleagues’ (2014) finding 
since, even in this latter study, adaptive choices in the switching task on Day 2 were associated with 
the feeling of regret experienced by children on Day 1. These findings were also similar to those 
obtained by Weisberg and Beck (2011); in fact, children felt sadder when they made the decision, 
than when the outcome was determined by the experimenter’s dice throw.  According to O’Connor 
and colleagues (2015), this discrepancy was possibly due to the intervention of other negative 
emotions, such as frustration. Thus, these findings demonstrated that the experience of such 
emotions, rather than their anticipation, underlies better decision making.   
Finally, an interesting contribution was provided by Derevensky and colleagues (2007), who 
showed that children (by the age of 10) had false beliefs about the influence of personal skills on the 
outcome of random events. In their study, 174 children were asked to answer to (i) a gambling 
activity questionnaire (consisting of 15 questions on the frequency and type of gambling activities 
in which they participated) and (ii) a cognitive perception questionnaire, which evaluated the 
participants’ perception about the involvement of skill and luck in gambling and no-gambling 
activities. Then, after filling the questionnaires, children accomplished a gambling task and they 
were asked, again, to fill the questionnaire after one and four weeks. The data collected before the 
performance in the gambling tasks, showed that children thought that both personal skills and luck 
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concurred to the success in gambling activities; whereas, after playing the task, their perception 
about the importance of personal skills decreased in favor of a greater involvement of luck.   
 
2.4 A new approach to study emotional states: the infrared thermography 
 Thanks to technological advances, skin temperature can be assessed by cameras with 
infrared thermography, that permit to record the functioning of the autonomic nervous system, 
constituting an effective method of detecting emotional states.  
 Infrared thermography is a non-invasive and ecological technique, which does not require 
direct contact with the individual’s body and allows the observation of physiological emotional 
responses during spontaneous situations (e.g., play or social interactions), by measuring the 
spontaneous thermal irradiation of the body. It is based on infrared image capture, which 
graphically map the temperature of all bodies by refined instruments, known as thermal imaging 
cameras, capable of obtaining and recording the thermal distribution and its variation in real time, 
getting a "colored" image, in which each color indicates the temperature of the body in a specific 
time interval. The strength of these instruments lies in their ability to capture the radiation emitted 
by the subject, while avoiding contact, ensuring that she is not exposed to radiation of any kind and 
allowing her to move spontaneously, allowing to overcome the disadvantages of some invasive 
techniques used in neuroscience. To accurately record temperature, it is necessary to make sure that 
any temperature variation is not the result of external interferences, so it is very important to 
accurately prepare the experimental setting where recording takes place, trying to avoid other 
sources of direct irradiation or ventilation. In addition, some parameters of the camera have to be 
set: (i) emissivity, referring to the amount of thermal radiation emitted by an object compared to the 
perfect black body one, which for human skin is around 1; (ii) the reflected temperature; (iii) the 
distance between the subject and the front of the camera's optics; (iv) the relative humidity 
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(Ioannou, Gallese & Merla, 2014). 
 Infrared thermography has many application (e.g., in medicine, engineering, in the industry 
and military fields). In humans, some areas of the face, the so-called regions of interest (ROI), are 
considered crucial to detect temperature variations (figure 1). Most of the studies using this 
technique found that the activation of the sympathetic nervous system corresponds to a temperature 
decrease in the nose region; in the same way, a decrease in temperature was noted above the upper 
lip and the jaw area as a result of the activation of the sudoripara gland; on the contrary, in these 
cases the temperature rises in the area of nose, forehead and between the eyes. Cooling of the 
cheeks, on the other hand, seems to be caused by the adrenergic system, which interacts with 
adrenaline (Ioannou et al., 2014). The emotions most investigated, by measuring if ROIs’ 
temperature elevates or decreases, are startle response, empathy, guilt, embarrassment, sexual 
arousal, stress, fear, anxiety, pain and joy (see Ioannou et al., 2014, for a review of these studies). 
  
 
Figure 1. Thermal representations of the ROIs (Berkovitz, Kirsch, Moxham, Alusi, & Cheesman, 2013). 
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 Thermal infrared imaging is a valuable method for studying adults’ sympathetic activity in 
stressful laboratory settings, for detecting potential gender differences of emotional responses to 
infants, for analyzing emotional states caused by gazing and social proximity, and finally for 
investigating sympathetic activity in clinical populations, such as patients with motor and 
intellectual disabilities (Engert et al., 2014; Esposito et al., 2015; Ioannou, et al., 2014; Suzuki et 
al., 2012).  
 In children's emotional development literature, infrared thermography has been used to 
evaluate emotions, such as empathy in mother-child interaction (Ebisch, Aureli, Bafunno, Cardone, 
Romani & Merla, 2012; Aureli, Grazia, Cardone & Merla, 2015), guilt (Ioannou et al., 2013) and 
joy (Nakanishi & Imai-Matsumura, 2008). Ebisch and colleagues (2012) studied maternal empathy 
during the Mishap paradigm. The experimenter gave the child what they called their favorite toy, 
which was earlier manipulated to be broken when playing with it. The authors distinguished five 
phases of the experiment: (i) “presentation”, when the experimenter invited the child to play with 
the toy; (ii) “playing”, when the child was left alone in the room to play; (iii) “mishap”, when the 
toy was broken; (iv) “re-entrance” of the experimenter; (v) “soothing” of the child, when the 
experimenter showed the child how to fix the toy and reassured her it was not her fault. Meanwhile, 
her mother watched the entire experiment in a separate room through a one-way mirror, unaware of 
the manipulation of the toy. Thermal data were recorded both on children and mothers, to evaluate 
how maternal empathy reflects onto the physiological level during a stressful situation experienced 
by their children. The authors detected facial temperature variations both for children and mothers, 
which indicated a sort of synchrony of their responses at physiological level. The mishap paradigm 
was also used by Ioannou and colleagues (2013) to assess guilt behavior in early childhood and 
their results confirmed the findings of the previous study. The authors observed a decrease in the 
temperature of the nasal tip in the mishap phase, as an indication of a sense of guilt, followed by an 
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increase in the temperature of the same area during the soothing phase, due to the activation of the 
parasympathetic system, as a result of the reassurance of the experimenter. 
 Aureli and colleagues (2015) used thermoimaging when administering the Still-Face 
paradigm to three- to four-month-old infants. This procedure consists in three moments of a facial-
facial interaction: (i) a normal mother-child interaction; (ii) the ‘still face’ moment, when the 
mother takes on a neutral expression and she is no more responsive to the child; (iii) the moment 
when the mother resumes the interaction. Then, the authors added a fourth moment of playing. They 
also collected behavioral data through the Infant and Caregiver Engagement Phases system. The 
results confirmed a parallelism between physiological and behavioral responses: children showed 
no signs of discomfort or stress during the still-face moment and no decrease in facial temperature, 
generally considered an emotional stress index. In contrast, a temperature increase has been 
recorded in support of the parasympathetic system activation as a result of children’s greater interest 
in the surrounding environment, and it is also confirmed by the behavioral data, which showed that 
children drove their attention outward as a result of the interruption of the interaction with their 
mothers.  
 Finally, a further confirmation of the validity of infrared thermography in detecting 
emotional responses is provided by the study of Nakanishi and Imai-Mutsumura (2008), which 
showed that the ROIs temperature of 2-to-10 month-old infants decreased significantly as a result of 
joyful expressions, such as laughter. 
 All the above studies showed that infrared thermography is a reliable technique for detecting 
emotional variations, as confirmed by behavioral data; hence, infrared thermography is especially 
suited to integrate physiological elements in the research of socio-emotional development, 
especially in children. In fact, this is a non-invasive technique that allows to infer emotional states 
based on physiological observations of peripheral vasoconstriction, preserving an ecological 
environment. 
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Chapter Three – Experimental Study 
3.1 Introduction 
The abilities to properly assess risk and to make advantageous choices are essential to avoid 
negative consequences, such as addictions, injuries, diseases and so on, caused by risky behaviors. 
Thus, a thorough understanding of the development of adaptive decision behavior can be  extremely 
useful to create early intervention programs. Unfortunately, the  trajectory of the development of the 
ability to deal with situations that require a choice between a safe and risky option is not yet fully 
understood. 
The underlying mechanisms of this construct are still not well-defined, nor are the cognitive, 
social or emotional factors involved in risky decision-making at different ages. The multiplicity of 
theoretical and methodological approaches which have tried to answer these questions, have often 
provide conflicting results. The analysis of the literature carried out in the previous chapters does 
not provide definitive answers to all questions, but highlights what are  three key points in the study 
of human decision making under risk: (i) risk propensity is not a stable trait, but evolves from 
childhood to adulthood, (ii) the maturation of executive functions and emotional regulation may 
decrease risk taking behaviors in the course of development, (iii) emotions and social context do 
affect children’s decision making under risk.  
Three year-old children, compared with older ones, appear to make irrational choices, which 
can lead them to negative and disadvantageous consequences. Already by the age of four, children 
begin  to make more advantageous choices, as five- and six year-olds indeed do. This changes have 
been  explained by taking into account the rapid maturation of executive functions and neural areas 
underlying decision-making that occurs in these years. Whereas it is quite clear which brain regions 
underlie decision making (orbitofrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, ventral striatum, anterior 
insula, amygdala, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex; Crone and van der Molen, 2004, 2007; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2006; Carlson et 
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al., 2009; Paulsen et al., 2012; Van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2015), it is still unclear what cognitive 
components are involved in decision-making under risk. In fact, not all authors agree in attributing 
an important role to the same components: for example, Hongwanishkul and colleagues (2005), 
Garon and Moore (2007), Van Duijvenvoorde and colleagues (2012) and Audusseau and colleagues 
(2015) consider as essential the role that working memory plays in potentially risky situations, 
helping children to make the most optimal decisions to achieve their purpose. In contrast, other 
authors found no correlation between children’s performances in memory tasks and gambling tasks, 
or between the latter and any other cognitive functions such as reasoning skills, language, inhibitory 
control and attention processes (Heilman et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2012; Mata et al., 2013; Beitz et 
al., 2014; Harms et al., 2014).  
Factors that can potentially affect children’s success in tasks requiring a choice in risky 
situations are the complexity of the task, the sensitivity to the frequency and magnitude of rewards 
or losses, the expected value and probability understanding. Bunch and colleagues (2007) and 
Andrews and Moussaumai (2015) observed that, when reducing the demands of the task, children’s 
performance improves in terms of a greater number of advantageous choices; however, other 
authors (Crone et al., 2005, 2007; Gao et al., 2009) claim that a low performance can be caused 
more by insensitivity to future outcomes rather than to task complexity. All authors agree that 
children’s decision-making is more influenced  by the frequency of the punishments rather than by 
their magnitude. As for the knowledge and the understanding of the principles of probability and 
expected value, the results are contrasting. Weller and colleagues (2011) and Steelandt and 
colleagues (2013) believe that this understanding does not occur during childhood and that  this lack 
of understanding leads children to be less cautious in their choices and more risk-prone. 
Disagreeing with this view, Harbaugh and colleagues (2002), Levin and colleagues (2007), 
Schlottmann and Anderson (1994), Schlottmann (201l), and Denison and Xu (2014) provided 
evidences in favor of an early understanding of probabilistic concepts, emerging   early in 
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childhood; therefore, according to these authors, the reasons  of a lower risk aversion in children 
should be  attributable to other factors and mechanisms. Girotto and colleagues (2016) in a recent 
study found that three- and five-year-olds were able to made optimal choices in tasks that did not 
require forming probabilistic expectation, but that only five-year-olds were able to make optimal 
choices in tasks involving an evaluation of chance, suggesting caution in interpreting infant’s ability 
to understand probability.  
Overall, the debate about emotions and social influences involved in decision making in 
risky situations is still open. In this context, the scenario is more homogeneous; in fact, the authors 
who dealt with this issue (Miller and Byrnes, 1997; Levin et al., 2007) achieved similar results, by 
identifying overconfidence, impulsivity, a low level of anxiety, adventure seeking, and peer 
influences as the potential factors associated with increased risk propensity, interacting 
independently from each other with decision-making processes. Impulsivity and low inhibition 
(expressed by a low level of anxiety) are predictors of potentially risk-taking behaviors already at 
the age of 10 (Vitaro and Wanner, 2011). Finally, recent studies in the field of emotional 
developmental research identified the feeling of regret as a possible factor that can guide children 
towards more careful and/or advantageous choices (O’Connor et al., 2012; Weisberg and Beck, 
2011; O’Connor et al., 2014; O’Connor et al., 2015; Guttentag & Ferrell, 2008; McCormack and 
Feeney, 2015).  
The above results suggest that the construct of risk propensity is multi-determined and thus 
it is impossible to pinpoint a single factor, either cognitive, emotional or social, as the causal factor 
determining it. The contrasting results provided by previous works, even within the same area of 
research, are possibly due, on one hand, to the  lack of a theory of reference (although this gap was 
partially filled by the theoretical model proposed by Andersen and colleagues, 2010), and on the 
other hand, to the fact that authors are inclined to focus only on one process of decision-making 
under risk at a time (i.e., expected utility vs emotions). In this latter case, the authors neglect the 
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existence of more than one latent process, that could actually have a weight on the ability to make a 
choice between a risky and a safe option and thus could explain part of the obtained results.  
In the light of the results emerging from the literature, the present study aimed to investigate, 
through a new experimental paradigm adapted from the research on risk propensity in non-human 
primates (Heilbronner, Rosati, Stevens, Haren & Hauser, 2008; De Petrillo, Ventricelli, Ponsi & 
Addessi, 2015), both the cognitive and the emotional processes involved in children’s decision-
making under risk. One of the strengths of this experimental procedure is that children are tested 
with an experimental paradigm that does not rely on the linguistic explanation of the task; 
furthermore, from this task it is possible to get indicators that allow a subtle analysis of the implicit 
strategies of choosing.  
 
3.2 Aims 
The aim of the present research was to assess risk proneness in four, five, six, seven and eight  
year old children. To this end, each child was administered (i) the Probabilistic Choice Task, 
adapted from a paradigm used with non-human primates (Heilbronner et al., 2008; De Petrillo et al., 
2015) and used here for the first time with children; (ii) a classical gambling task, the Children's 
Gambling Task (CGT) (Kerr and Zelazo, 2004); (iii) a simple bet task. In the Probabilistic Choice 
task and in the Bet Task, children were required to express their emotion following the outcome of 
their choices on the 5-point rating scale (Wiseberg and Beck, 2011). In addition, children completed 
two control tests: the BIN 4-6 battery and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, to control for the 
influence of both linguistic understanding and mathematical reasoning on the ability to choose in 
uncertain situations (see below for a detailed description of all tasks).  
The administration of the Probabilistic Choice Task, previously used in experimental 
protocols with non-human primates, allowed to understand whether biases in risky decision making 
are shared between humans and other non-human primates, or whether they are more recent 
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acquisition possibly culturally determined. In addition, this research aimed to evaluate how 
emotions, linked to the choice outcome in a gambling task, can affect the ability of children to make 
decisions under risk (O’Connor et al., 2012; Weisberg & Beck, 2011; O’Connor et al., 2014; 
O’Connor et al., 2015, Guttentag & Ferrell, 2008; McCormack & Feeney, 2015). To this end, 
thermal images were recorded for a sub sample of children, using an infrared camera, to investigate 
children physiological responses to the proposed stimuli. To my knowledge, this is the first study 
that used the infrared thermography to assess children’s emotional reactions in a decision-making 
task. Children's emotional responses were analyzed taking into account the outcomes of their 
choices, comparing behavioral and physiological measures, with particular emphasis on their role 
on children's risky preferences. 
Taking into account the probabilities, I hypothesized that children were able to make more 
choices from the advantageous deck in the CGT and that they preferred the risky option more in the 
Advantageous condition of the Probabilistic Choice Task, in which the probability associated to 
obtaining the larger reward was higher than in the other two conditions. This ability to make 
advantageous decisions is supposed to change and improve during development, also as a function 
of an improvement of numerical skills. Furthermore, I assumed to detect differences in the 
performances in the two above mentioned tasks, due to the concept of loss inherent in the CGT, but 
absent in the Probabilistic Choice Task, in which I supposed to observe a greater number of risky 
choices. Finally, I expected a correspondence between the answers provided by children to the 5-
point rating scale and changes at the physiological level, as expression of emotional states, which 
could affect the risky preferences of children, depending on age.  
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3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Participants 
I tested 183 children aged from four to eight years old (61 four-year-olds, M= 49,24; 65 
five-year-olds, M= 62,08; 29 six-year-olds, M= 74,06; 20 seven-year-olds, M= 84,11; 8 eight-year-
olds, M= 94,10), recruited from kindergartens and primary school of the large metropolitan area of 
Rome: “Casa dei Bambini”, “Istituto Comprensivo Giovanni Battista Valente” and “Asili Infantili 
Israelitici”. Children belonged to middle-class families (as determined by parental educational 
level). Parents were provided with a letter describing the general aims and the procedure of the 
study and written parental consent was obtained for children to participate in the tests and for the  
video recording.  
Each child was tested in two gambling tasks (the Probabilistic Choice Task and the CGT), 
and in a bet task. In addition, they were administered: a bet task; the Peabody Picture Vocabulary 
Test, in the Italian version by Stella, Pizzoli and Tressoldi (2000), to measure the level of linguistic 
comprehension, and the BIN 4-6 battery (Molin, Poli and Lucangeli, 2007), to evaluate numerical 
skills. 
3.3.2 Materials 
In the Probabilistic Choice Task, bowls of different color and shape were used: the reward 
corresponding to each option (safe and risky) was placed under each bowl (Figure 2). The 
assignment of the bowls to the different options was counterbalanced across subjects. Some 
participants received real stimuli as rewards (jelly beans or stickers), whereas others received tokens 
(colored pebbles) that they exchanged with the experimenter to get the real reward (stickers or 
jellybeans, depending on the reward the child was assigned to) at the end of the test. 
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 Figure 2. Bowls utilized in the Probabilistic Choice Task (Photo by Eleonora Tomei) 
 
In the CGT, the experimental material consisted of two 50-card decks, one with the back 
covered by white and black vertical stripes, the other covered by black dots on a white background. 
The front of each card is divided into a white half with depicted smiling faces, corresponding to the 
number of won rewards, and in a black half, depicting sad faces, corresponding to the number of 
lost rewards (Figure 3). 
Stickers and jelly beans, counterbalanced across subjects, were used as rewards in the 
Probabilistic Choice Task. In the CGT, only stickers were used as rewards. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Samples of cards utilized in the CGT 
 
In the Bet Task, a coin with the two sides of two different colors (yellow and green) was used 
(Figure 4). 
 
57 
 
 
Figure 4. Coin utilized in the Bet Task. 
 
3.3.3 Procedure 
Children were individually tested in a quiet room of the school they attended. Responses of 
a  sub-sample of 15 children were recorded using an infrared camera and collected in a laboratory 
of the Department of Dynamic and Clinical Psychology of “Sapienza” University of Rome, suitable 
to guarantee the thermal conditions required for the use of an infrared camera. All tasks were 
administrated by two female experimenters, who alternated their role as experimenter and assistant 
across sessions. The experimenter administered the tasks and the assistant scored children’s 
performance on the protocol sheet. The entire session was also video-recorded and a DVD of the 
experiment was given to parents who accepted to participate at the study as a token of participation. 
Each testing session lasted around one hour. Data collection was carried out between October 2015 
and July 2017.  
At the beginning of the experimental session, a familiarization phase, in which the child and 
the experimenter played together spontaneously, was carried out. Between tasks there were short 
free play break, where the experimenter and the child interacted for a few minutes. 
Before starting with the actual administration, the experimenter advised the teacher or the 
parent, if present, to avoid as much as possible to intervene while the child was performing the tests, 
in order to avoid any kind of interference or suggestion in the responses. Children were tested in 
one single session and each child was administered five tasks (please see paragraph 3.3.1). 
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The Probabilistic Choice Task 
In the Probabilistic Choice Task, children were asked to choose between a safe option (four 
rewards) and a risky option (one or seven rewards). Three experimental conditions were provided, 
manipulating the chance to obtain the reward when choosing the risky option: (1) Neutral condition, 
(2) Advantageous condition, and (3) Disadvantageous condition. In the Neutral condition the risky 
option had a probability of 50% to provide one reward or seven rewards. In the Advantageous 
condition the risky option had a 67% chance to provide seven rewards and 33% to provide one 
reward. In the Disadvantageous condition the risky option had a probability of 33% to provide 
seven rewards and 67% to provide one reward. The reward associated to the safe option 
corresponded to four rewards in all conditions. A between-subject design was employed and each 
child was randomly assigned to one experimental condition. 
During the experimental session, the child was seated at a table near to the experimenter, 
whereas the assistant was seated on the opposite side of the table. Two colored curtains separated 
the child’s table area from the assistant so that the child could not see what she did when setting up 
each trial. A platform, on which the two options were presented, was located on the table between 
the child and the assistant (Figure 5). At the beginning of the session, the experimenter explained to 
the child how the test worked. The experimenter showed to the child the two upside-down bowls, 
explaining that if she selected  the safe bowl she was going to win always four rewards (jellybeans, 
stickers or pebbles), whereas if she selected the risky bowl she could win one or seven rewards. In 
the Neutral condition the experimenter added that choosing the "risky" bowl would have allowed 
her to get sometime one and sometime seven rewards; in the Advantageous condition the 
experimenter said that choosing the "risky" bowl would have given to her many times seven 
rewards and a few times one reward, and in the Disadvantageous condition, the experimenter told 
the child that choosing the "risky" bowl would have given to her many times one reward and a few 
times seven rewards. To facilitate the child’s comprehension of the task demands, the experimenter 
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indicated with gestures the number of rewards associated with each upside-down bowl. Half of the 
subjects started the familiarization trials with the risky option and the other half with the safe 
option.   
Each session started with four familiarization trials, with only one option available, followed 
by 10 free-choice trials, in which children could choose between the safe and the risky option, for a 
total of 14 trials per session. The position of the risky option (right or left) was pseudo-randomized 
across trials. Each trial began when the experimenter opened the curtain allowing the child to see 
the two bowls (in experimental trials) or a single bowl (in the familiarization trials). The child could 
choose one of the two options (or, in the familiarization trial, the only option available) by lifting 
the chosen bowl and taking the reward underneath it. A plastic container was given to the child to 
accumulate his/her rewards. As soon as the child made her choice, there was a 10-second interval, 
during which the experimenter refrained from making verbal comments and interacting with the 
child.  
 
 
Figure 5. The figure depicts a child performing the Probabilistic Choice  
Task in the food condition (Photo by Eleonora Tomei). 
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At the end of the task, to assess children’s level of awareness of the task, they were asked  two  
questions. First, the experimenter indicated the “safe” bowl and asked: “How many rewards can you 
find below it?”; then, she showed her the “risky” bowl and asked the child the same question.  
 
Emotional Self-rating  
In the Probability Choice Task, ten seconds after the child's choice the experimenter showed 
her the 5-point rating scale (Weisberg and Beck 2011, Figure 6), and asked: "Could you show me 
how happy or sad are you of winning ‘x’ rewards?" and the child had to point an arrow to the smile 
that best represented her feeling. Then, the experimenter told the child: "Now I'm going to show 
you what you could have won" and then she showed her the content of the unselected bowl, taking 
care to keep the reward just received by the child in view, saying: "If you chose this bowl you 
would have won ‘y’ stickers". Then, the experimenter asked her again: "And now, how happy or sad 
are you of winning ‘x’ instead of ‘y’?" 
 
 
Figure 6. The 5-point rating scale (Weisberg and Beck, 2011) 
 
Training on Emotional Recognition  
The experimenter showed the child the 5-point rating scale and asked the child to indicate 
first the very happy face and then the very sad one. If the child did not respond correctly, the 
experimenter asked her to retry, saying: "What is the really, really sad / happy face?" 
Then, the child was explained how to use the arrows underneath the scale to indicate the 
emotion experienced along the continuum. Starting from the neutral face, the experimenter moved 
the arrows to the left, showing the saddest smileys, then moved them to the right towards the 
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happiest ones. Children had to perform a two sessions in the training phase: in the first session, five 
rewards were given to the child and, starting from the neutral face, she was asked to point the 
arrows on the smile that best represented how happy or sad she was of having received those 
rewards. Subsequently, the experimenter removed four rewards from the child’s endowment and 
showed her again the scale and asked her how she felt now (starting from the face the child had 
previously indicated). For both correct and incorrect answers, a feedback was given to the child. If 
she did not provide the correct answers, the training phase continued with another five trials, in 
which the children faced different situations where they could win, lose or get the same number of 
rewards. 
 
The Children’s Gambling Task 
In the Children’s Gambling Task, the child had to select a set of cards from an advantageous 
and a disadvantageous deck. During the experimental session, the bottom half of each card was 
covered with a post-it, which the experimenter took away during the test to reveal the magnitude of 
the loss. In both decks the number of rewards that could be won remained fixed, whereas the 
amount of rewards that could be lost varied; the advantageous deck cards provided a win of one 
reward and a loss of zero or one reward (with an average payout of five rewards per ten cards); the 
disadvantageous deck cards provided a win of two and a loss of zero, four, five or six rewards (with 
an average loss of five rewards per ten cards). Each child faced six demonstration trials and fifty 
experimental trials. The decks were placed on a table in front of the child. A plastic container, 
where the child could accumulate her rewards, was placed between the decks. 
At the beginning of the session, the experimenter gave ten rewards to the child and showed 
her, in the training tests, how to select the cards by choosing three consecutive cards from each 
deck. For each choice, the rewards were provided to the child or withdrawn depending on the faces 
represented on each card. At the end of the demonstration session, the experimenter encouraged the 
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child to choose the cards from the deck she preferred to try to maximize her rewards. The test ended 
with the choice of the fiftieth card; if the child interrupted the test in earlier, it was considered valid 
if the child made at least 45 choices.   
 
Figure 7. The figure depicts a child performing the Children’s Gambling Task. 
 
BIN 4-6 Battery 
The BIN 4-6 battery (Molin, Poli and Lucangeli, 2007) was developed to analyze the various 
components at the basis of mathematical learning, in order to identify strengths or weaknesses of 
the child and reinforce, in a targeted way, any area that results at risk. 
The battery consists of 11 tests related to four areas of investigation: 
Semantic Area 
- Comparison of quantities 
- Comparison of Arabic numerals 
 
Counting Area 
- Forward and backward Enumeration  
- Seriation of Arabic numerals 
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- Completion of numerical series  
Lexical Area 
- Matching name-number 
- Reading numbers written in  Arabic code  
- Writing numbers 
 
Pre-syntactic area 
- Correspondence between Arabic numerals and quantities 
- One-to-many 
- Magnitude order 
 
 The Bet Task  
 In this task, the experimenter showed the child a coin with one green side and one yellow 
side and asked her to bet on one of the two faces to win five rewards. The experimenter explained her 
that in case of extraction of the face that she did not choose, she would have to give up five of her 
rewards, obtained in the previous tasks (Probabilistic Choice Task and CGT). Then, the experimenter 
performed a test toss, in which there were no wins or losses, and subsequently asked the child to throw 
the coin for five experimental trials. Before each toss, the experimenter asked the child if she wanted 
to stop or to continue with the game. After each toss, the experimenter waited for ten seconds without 
commenting or interacting with the child and then showed the child the 5-point rating scale (Weisberg 
and Beck 2011), asking her: "Could you show me how happy or sad you are to have chosen 
‘yellow/green’?". The child had to point the arrow to the smile corresponding to her emotion. 
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 Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test 
The revised version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary test (PPVT-R), developed by Dunn & 
Dunn (1981) and adapted for the Italian population by Stella, Pizzoli, & Tressoldi (2000), is an 
instrument used for evaluating receptive vocabulary in children.  
The experimenter and the child sat next to each other. In front of the child was placed the 
book containing the 175 tables useful for the test. Before starting the test, the examiner calculated the 
chronological age of the child, and then she showed her the training table A saying "I would like you 
to look at some figures with me. Look at all the figures on this page, I'll say a word and then I want 
you to point out with the finger the figure of the word I said. Let's try. Put your finger on .... ". If the 
child gave a correct answer, the training continued with table B and if the child still answered 
correctly, the experimenter went on with table C. 
For the training tables, if the child pointed at an incorrect drawing, before moving to the next 
table the experimenter indicated the correct answer. The item needed to be repeated until the child 
gave the correct answer, before moving on to the next table. 
After the training was completed, the experimenter went on to the expected starting point 
according to the child’s age, indicated in the recording sheet, and said: "Now I'll show you other 
figures. Every time I say a word you have to find the best figure. I'm not sure you know the meaning of 
all the words but I want you to look at them carefully and choose what you think is right. Tell me .... " 
The experimenter gave the child an approval whatever the child response was, but 
differentiated between correct and incorrect answers with phrases such as "This is a good response", 
"Good", "Very good", in the case of a correct answer, and with phrases like 'I understand', 'Okay', in 
the case of incorrect answers. During the test, the experimenter had to keep an equally positive tone, 
encouraging a response in case the child found it difficult. The test ended when the child made six 
errors in eight consecutive responses. The total score was computed by subtracting from the last item 
administered (ceiling item) the number of errors made between the basal item (the last item of the first 
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series of eight consecutive correct responses) and the ceiling item. This score was then standardized 
for analysis purposes. 
 
3.3.4 Order of tasks presentation 
For each age group, the order of presentation of the two  gambling tasks was counterbalanced 
across subjects, whereas the last three tasks were administered in a fixed order. Thus, a first group of 
children received the CGT as the initial test, followed by the Probabilistic Choice Task, the BIN test, 
the Bet Task and then the Peabody test; a second group of children received the Probabilistic Choice 
Task, followed by the CGT, the BIN test, the Bet Task, and finally the Peabody test. 
 
 3.4 Data coding 
 
3.4.1 Behavioral data coding 
 
For all tasks, the assistant scored participants’ responses  by paper and pencil, and coding was 
subsequently scored from videotapes.  
For the Probabilistic Choice Task, the primary dependent variable for the Probabilistic Choice 
Task was the proportion of choices of the risky option (the number of risky choices divided the 
number of trials). Moreover, the following variables were coded: 
- Latency to choose 
- Task Awareness Question 1: child’s response to the question “How many rewards can you 
find below it?” in relation to the safe bowl; a score of two was assigned if the child gave the 
correct answer. If she was wrong or did not remember, a score of zero was assigned. 
- Task Awareness Question 2: child’s response “How many rewards can you find below it? 
related to the risky bowl; a score of two was assigned if the child gave the correct answer, a 
score of one if the answer was partially correct and a score of zero if the child was 
completely wrong or did not remember. 
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 For the Children’s Gambling Task, for analysis purposes the 50 trials were divided into five 
blocks of 10 trials each. The dependent variable was the proportion of advantageous choices per block 
minus the proportion of disadvantageous choices per block, which yielded a difference score ranging 
from -1 to 1 for each block.  
 For the Bet Task, the dependent variables were the percentage of toss performed (maximum 
five) and the winning frequency, i.e., the number of winning matches divided by the number of games 
played. 
For the BIN battery, the dependent variables were the scores obtained by children in each area 
and the total score realized in all the eleven tests.  
For the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, the following variables were coded: 
- Raw score: number of correct answers in the critical range, obtained by subtracting the 
number of wrong answers from the total number of items the child responded to. 
- Standardized score: score obtained using the raw score and the chronological age of the 
child, referring to the normative table provided by the manual. 
Furthermore, the emotional correlates of the Probabilistic Choice Task and the Bet Task were 
evaluated. The smiles of the 5-point rating scale were assigned a numerical code, ranging from one, 
corresponding to the saddest face, to five corresponding to the happiest face. The variables scored for 
the emotional evaluation were:  
- Emotion 1: emotion expressed by the child after choosing an option (from one to five); 
- Emotion 2: emotion expressed by the child after seeing the alternative option (from one to 
five); 
- Coherence of emotional responses given the outcomes of the choices: it was assigned a score 
of one to coherent responses and a score of zero to incoherent responses; 
- Switching: number of times the child decided to change her first choice, trying to select the 
unchosen option. 
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 Finally, from the video analysis, it was possible to score four major classes of behavior 
exhibited by children during the 10 seconds following each of their choices:  
- Waiting strategies, such as: looking around, looking at the experimenter, drumming fingers 
on the table. 
- Positive expressions, such as: laughing, smiling, exulting. 
- Negative expressions, such as: snorting, banging the fist on the table. 
- Self-directed behaviors, such as: scratching, touching herself. 
- Manipulation of experimental material, such as: playing or touching experimental material, 
including the bowls, the coin and the rewards.  
 
 3.4.2 Thermal data coding 
 In order to investigate the autonomic response of children to the stimuli presented in the 
Probabilistic Choice Task, the facial temperature of a sample of 15 children was recorded, focusing on 
the temperature variations of the nasal tip area, which has been proved to be one of the most reliable 
regions to detect the activation of the sympathetic system in response to emotional or stressful stimuli 
(Nakanishi and Imai-Matsumura,2008; Ioannou et. al., 2013; Manini et al., 2013; Aureli et al., 2015). 
Using a tracking software, it was possible to obtain thermal signals of specific ROIs. Then these 
signals were analyzed, by computing the slope of the thermal signal using the Matlab software.  
For the Probabilistic Choice Task, three phases were identified: (i) phase 1: the moment 
before choosing an option, which represents the baseline condition; (ii) phase 2: the moment after 
seeing the choice outcome; (iii) phase 3: the moment after the experimenter revealed the outcome of 
the unchosen option.  
The dependent variable was the slope of the thermal signals in each phase.  
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Figure 8. Thermal video image during the Probabilistic Choice Task. 
 
3.5 Reliability 
 Reliability was calculated on a subsample of 20 subjects. All sessions were independently 
scored by two trained observers. Reliability was measured by calculating the Pearson correlation 
coefficient (r) for the latency to choose scored in the Probabilistic Choice Task and by computing 
the concordance index for all other variables. 
For the Probabilistic Choice Task, the reliability for the latency to choose was r = 0,88 (p 
<0.001, N = 20), the reliability for proportion of choice of the risky option and for other variables 
(“Task Awareness Question 1” and "Task Awareness Question 2") was 100%. 
For the Bet Task, the reliability for the variables "Percentage of Toss Performed" and 
"Winning Frequency" was 100%. 
For the BIN battery and the Peabody Test, reliability for all variables was 100%. 
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3.6 Results 
 This section reports the results obtained on the entire sample. Due to the small number of 
six-, seven- and eight-year-olds, for analysis purposes the data of these children were treated as a 
single age group of older children.  
 The analysis of the emotional correlates was performed only for the Probabilistic Choice 
Task and the Bet Task. 
 Parents’ level of education was analyzed: the level of education of six-seven-eight-year-
olds’ parents was significantly lower than the level of education of four- and five-year-olds 
(Kruskal Wallis ANOVA: maternal level of education: H(2, N= 156)= 29.52, p< 0.01; paternal 
level of education: H(2, N= 153)= 19.86, p< 0.01; Mann Whitney U test: maternal level of 
education: 4-year-olds’ parents vs. 5-year-olds’ parents: Z= -0.55, N1= 52, N2= 49, p= 0.59; 4-year-
olds’ parents vs. 6-7-8-year-olds’ parents: Z= -4.90, N1= 52, N2= 55, p< 0.01; 5-year-olds’ parents 
vs. 6-7-8-year-olds’ parents: Z= -4.30, N1= 49, N2= 55, p< 0.01; paternal level of education: 4-year-
olds’ parents vs. 5-year-olds’ parents: Z= -0.98, N1= 52, N2= 48, p= 0.33; 4-year-olds’ parents vs. 
6-7-8-year-olds’ parents: Z= -4.30, N1= 52, N2= 53, p< 0.01; 5-year-olds’ parents vs. 6-7-8-year-
olds’ parents: Z= -3.17, N1= 48, N2= 53, p= 0.002). 
 
3.6.1 The Probabilistic Choice Task 
 The Probabilistic Choice Task was administered to 183 children, 90 males and 93 females 
(see Table 1 for the sample subdivision in the three experimental conditions). 
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 4-year-olds 5-year-olds 6-7-8-year-olds 
Neutral Condition 33 32 16 
Advantageous Condition 14 17 19 
Disadvantageous 
Condition 
14 16 22 
Table 1. Distribution of children in the three conditions of the Probabilistic Choice Task. 
 
For each experimental condition, the analysis of the distribution of data was performed 
using the Shapiro-Wilk Test. Data did not result normally distributed (Neutral condition: W=0.81, 
p< 0.01; Advantageous condition: W=0.89, p< 0.01; Disadvantageous condition: W= 0.94, p= 
0.02); thus, non-parametric analyses were carried out. 
Considering the whole sample, it was assessed whether the type of reward 
(stickers/jellybeans), the type of stimulus (stickers/jellybeans/pebbles), and the different 
environments in which the experiment was carried out (different schools and laboratory) influenced 
children’s risky choices. None of these variables had a significant effect (Mann Whitney U test: 
reward: jellybeans vs. stickers: Z= -0.24, N1= 34, N2= 149, p= 0.81; Kruskal Wallis ANOVA: 
stimuli: H (2, N = 183) = 1.48, p = 0.48; Mann Whitney U test: stimuli: jellybeans vs. stickers: Z= -
0.46, N1= 34, N2= 58, p= 0.65; jellybeans vs. pebbles: Z= -0.68, N1= 34, N2= 91, p= 0.50; stickers 
vs. pebbles: Z= -1.14, N1= 58, N2= 91, p= 0.26; Kruskal Wallis ANOVA: environments: H (3, N = 
183) = 4.08, p = 0.25; Mann Whitney U test: environments: Casa dei Bambini vs. Istituto Valente: 
Z= -1.54, N1= 90, N2= 70, p= 0.12; Casa dei Bambini vs. Asili Israelitici: Z= -1.27, N1= 90, N2= 5, 
p= 0.20; Casa dei Bambini vs. laboratory: Z= -1.24, N1= 90, N2= 18, p= 0.21; Aisli Israelitici vs. 
Istituto Valente: Z= -0.60, N1= 5, N2= 70, p= 0.55; Asili Israelitici vs. laboratory: Z= -0.94, N1= 5, 
N2= 18, p= 0.35; laboratory vs. Istituto Valente: Z= -0.16, N1= 18, N2= 70, p= 0.87). 
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A Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA showed a significant effect of the experimental condition on the 
children’s proportion of risky choice (H (2, N = 183) = 9.78, p = 0.008). In particular, as shown in 
Figure 9, children preferred the risky option more in the Advantageous condition than in the Neutral 
and in the Disadvantageous conditions (Mann Whitney U test: Neutral condition vs. Advantageous 
condition: Z= -2.52, N1= 81, N2= 50, p= 0.01; Neutral condition vs. Disadvantageous condition: Z= 
-0.80, N1= 81, N2= 62, p= 0.42; Advantageous condition vs. Disadvantageous condition: Z= -2.90, 
N1= 50, N2= 62, p= 0.004). No main effects of gender or age were found (gender: Z= -1, N= 183, 
p= 0.32; age: Z= 323, N= 183, p= 0.20).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Probabilistic Choice Task: proportion of choice of the risky option in the three experimental 
conditions. 
 
 
Children’s responses to the two awareness questions presented at the end of the Probabilistic 
Choice Task were significantly correlated (Spearman correlation: rs = 0.17, N = 178, p= 0.04). 
Moreover, the Spearman correlations between children’s chronological age and their answers to the 
two awareness questions showed that older children (5-year-olds and 6-7-8-year-olds) gave 
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significantly more correct responses than four-year-olds (Spearman correlation: first awareness 
question, rs = 0.38, N = 178, p< 0.01; second awareness question, rs = 0.51, N = 178, p< 0.01, see 
Figures 10, 11). When controlling for age, there was no significant correlation between the 
proportion of choice of the risky option and the two awareness questions (partial correlation: first 
awareness question, rs = 0.13, N = 175, p= 0.10; second awareness question, rs = 0.02, N = 175, p= 
0.76). No correlation was found between the latency to choose and the proportion of choices of the 
risky option (rs= -0.01, N= 181, p= 0.88). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Probabilistic Choice Task: children’s responses to Awareness question1 depending on  
age. 
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Figure 11. Probabilistic Choice Task: children’s responses to Awareness question2 depending 
 on age. 
 
Then, for each experimental condition, the effects of gender and age, type of reward and 
type of stimulus on the proportion of choice of the risky option were analyzed.  
In the Neutral condition, there was no effect of gender (Mann Whitney U test: Z = -1.47, N= 
81, p = 0.14), age (Kruskal Wallis ANOVA: H (2, N = 81) = 0.02, p = 0.99; Mann Whitney U test: 
4-year-olds vs. 5-year-olds: Z= -0.12, N1= 33, N2= 32, p= 0.91; 4-year-olds vs. 6-7-8-year-olds: Z= -
0.12, N1= 33, N2= 16, p= 0.91; 5-year-olds vs. 6-7-8-year-olds: Z= -0.05, N1= 32, N2= 16, p= 0.96), 
type of reward (Mann Whitney U test: jellybeans vs. stickers: Z= -0.23, N1= 23, N2= 58, p= 0.82) 
and type of stimulus (Kruskal Wallis ANOVA: H (2, N= 81) = 0.08, p = 0.96;  Mann Whitney U 
test: jellybeans vs. stickers: Z= -0.23, N1= 23, N2= 34, p= 0.81; jellybeans vs. pebbles: Z= -0.17, 
N1= 23, N2= 24, p= 0.87; stickers vs. pebbles: Z= -0.19, N1= 34, N2= 24, p= 0.85) on the proportion 
of choice of the risky option.  
There were no significant correlations between children’s choices of the risky option and 
their responses to both awareness questions (Spearman correlation: first awareness question, rs = 
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0.03, N = 80, p = 0.78; second awareness question, rs = 0.07, N = 80, p = 0.55), and between latency 
to choose and children’s choices of the risky option (Spearman correlation: rs = -0.11, N = 81, p = 
0.33).  
Following the studies of Rosati and Hare (2013) and De Petrillo, Tonachella and Addessi 
(2017), the individual reward sensitivity index was calculated, by subtracting the number of choices 
of the risky option following one-reward outcomes from the number of choices of the risky option 
following seven-reward outcomes, as an index of motivation in order to investigate how previous 
trial outcomes impacted current trial choice. There was a marginally significant correlation between 
the individual reward sensitivity index and the proportion of choice of the risky option (Spearman 
correlation: rs = -0.31, N = 81, p = 0.06); this correlation was significant when controlling for age 
(partial correlation: rs = -0.29, N = 78, p = 0.01). There was not a significant correlation between the 
individual reward sensitivity index and age (Spearman correlation: rs = -0.20, N = 81, p = 0.07). 
Similarly, in the Advantageous condition, there was no effect of gender (Mann Whitney U 
test: Z = -0,38, N= 50, p = 0.71), type of reward (Mann Whitney U test: jellybeans vs. stickers: Z= -
0.81, N1= 5, N2= 45, p= 0.42) and type of stimulus (Kruskal Wallis ANOVA: H (2, N= 50) = 1.88, p 
= 0.39;  Mann Whitney U test: jellybeans vs. stickers: Z= 0.00, N1= 5, N2= 12, p= 1; jellybeans vs. 
pebbles: Z= -1.10, N1= 5, N2= 33, p= 0.28; stickers vs. pebbles: Z= -1.05, N1= 12, N2= 33, p= 0.29) 
on the proportion of choice of the risky option. Whereas, there was an effect of age (Kruskal Wallis 
ANOVA: H (2, N = 50) = 5.34, p = 0.07; Mann Whitney U test: 4-year-olds vs. 5-year-olds: Z= -
2.04, N1= 14, N2= 17, p= 0.04; 4-year-olds vs. 6-7-8-year-olds: Z= -0.91, N1= 14, N2= 19, p= 0.36; 5-
year-olds vs. 6-7-8-year-olds: Z= -1.74, N1= 17, N2= 19, p= 0.08) on the proportion of choice of the 
risky option (as shown in Figure 12). 
A non-parametric t-tests (Wilcoxon Single Sample Test) revealed that 5-year-old children 
made more choices of the risky option (p = 0.005) than the random level. 
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Figure 12. Probabilistic Choice Task: Age differences on the proportion of choice of  
the risky option in the Advantageous condition. 
 
 
There was no significant correlation between children’s choices of the risky option and their 
responses to the first awareness questions (Spearman correlation: first awareness question, rs = 0.20, 
N = 46, p = 0.19) but there was a significant correlation between children’s choices of the risky 
option and the second awareness question (Spearman correlation: rs = 0.32, N = 46, p = 0.03). 
However, when controlling for age, the relation turned out non-significant (partial correlation: rs = 
0.24, N = 43, p = 0,12). There was neither a significant correlation between latency to choose and 
children’s choices of the risky option (Spearman correlation: rs = 0.18, N = 49, p = 0.22), nor 
between the individual reward sensitivity index and the proportion of choice of the risky option 
(Spearman correlation: rs = 0.17, N = 50, p = 0.24). However, the latter correlation was significant 
when controlling for age (partial correlation: rs = 0.30, N = 47, p = 0.04). There was not a 
significant correlation between the individual reward sensitivity index and age (Spearman 
correlation: rs = -0.23, N = 50, p = 0.11). 
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In the Disadvantageous condition, there was no effect of gender (Mann Whitney U test: Z = 
-0.26, N= 52, p = 0.79), type of reward (Mann Whitney U test: jellybeans vs. stickers: Z= -0.38, 
N1= 6, N2= 46, p= 0.70) and type of stimulus (Kruskal Wallis ANOVA: H (2, N= 52) = 0.18, p = 
0.92; Mann Whitney U test: jellybeans vs. stickers: Z= -0.62, N1= 6, N2= 12, p= 0.54; jellybeans vs. 
pebbles: Z= -0.27, N1= 6, N2= 34, p= 0.79; stickers vs. pebbles: Z= -0.13, N1= 12, N2= 34, p= 0.90) 
on the proportion of choice of the risky option.  
A Kruskal Wallis ANOVA showed an age effect on the proportion of choice of the risky 
option (H (2, N = 52) = 7.06, p = 0.03). The group of older children made more risky choices than 
4- and 5-year-olds (Mann Whitney U test: 4-year-olds Vs 5-year-olds: Z = -0.28, N= 30, p = 0.78; 
4-year-olds Vs 6-7-8-year-olds: Z = -1.99, N= 36, p = 0.05; 5-year-olds Vs 6-7-8-year-olds: Z = -
2.42, N= 38, p = 0.02; see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13. Probabilistic Choice Task: Age differences on the proportion of choice of the  
risky option in the Disadvantageous condition. 
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A non-parametric t-tests (Wilcoxon Single Sample Test) revealed that 5-year-old children 
choose the risky option below the random level in this condition (p = 0.03).  
There were neither significant correlations between children’s choices of the risky option 
and their responses to both awareness questions (Spearman correlation: first awareness question, rs 
= 0.24, N = 52, p = 0.09; second awareness question: rs = -0.03, N = 52, p = 0.85), nor between 
latency to choose and children’s choice of the risky option (Spearman correlation: rs = -0.08, N = 
51, p = 0.56). There was a significant correlation between the individual reward sensitivity index 
and the proportion of choice of the risky option (Spearman correlation: rs = -0.48, N = 52, p< 0.01); 
this correlation was significant even when controlling for age (Spearman correlation: rs = -0.49, N = 
49, p< 0.01). There was also a significant correlation between the individual reward sensitivity 
index and age (Spearman correlation: rs = -0.33, N = 52, p = 0.02): the group of older children were 
less sensitive to rewards than four- and five-year-olds. 
  
 Evaluation of emotional correlates 
 Considering the whole sample, there was a significant difference between the emotions 
reported by the children on the 5-point rating scale depending on the outcome of their choice 
(Friedman's ANOVA: Chi Sqr.= 1041, p< 0,01, N= 1105). Children reported to feel sadder when 
receiving one reward than when they received four or seven rewards; furthermore they declared to 
feel sadder when receiving four rewards instead of seven (see Table 2). In the same way,  
significant differences emerged between emotion 2 and the various outcomes as shown in the table 
below (Table 3). In particular, children reported to feel happier when they received (i) four rewards 
instead of one, (ii) seven rewards instead of four.  
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emotion1_outcome4 - 
emotion1_outcome1 
emotion1_outcome7 - 
emotion1_outcome1 
emotion1_outcome7 - 
emotion1_outcome4 
Z -10.006b -13.036b -6.379b 
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Table 2. Probabilistic Choice Task: the table reports the Wilcoxon post-hoc tests for the comparisons of 
emotions 1 depending on the choice outcome. 
 
 
emotion2_outco
me7     vs.  
emotion2_outco
me1 
emotion2_outcome
4_alternative1 vs. 
emotion2_outcome
1 
emotion2_outcome4
_alternative7 vs. 
emotion2_outcome1 
emotion2_outcome4_
alternative1 vs. 
emotion2_outcome7 
emotion2_outcome4_
alternative7 vs. 
emotion2_outcome7 
Z -8.935 -6.027 -2.508 -3.296 -6.759 
Signific
-ance 
0.000 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.000 
 
Table 3. Probabilistic Choice Task: the table reports the Wilcoxon post-hoc tests for the comparisons of 
emotions 2 depending on the choice outcome. 
 
 
A Friedman’s ANOVA carried out to investigate the coherence of children’s responses to 
the 5-point rating scale depending on the outcome of their choices (interpreted as the ability to 
report emotions of happiness as a result of favorable results or sadness as a result of unfavorable 
outcomes) yielded a significant result (Chi Sqr.= 996, p< 0.01); in particular, there were significant 
differences between: (i) coherence following outcome 4 vs. coherence following outcome 1 (Z= -
5.38, p< 0.01); (ii) coherence following outcome 7 vs. coherence following outcome 1 (Z= -8.01, 
p< 0.01); (iii) coherence following outcome 4_alternative 1 vs. coherence following outcome 1 (Z= 
-6.40, p< 0.01); (iv) coherence following outcome 4_alternative 7 vs. coherence following outcome 
1 (Z= -4.67, p< 0.01); (v) coherence following outcome 4  vs. coherence following outcome 7 (Z= -
2.57, p= 0.01); (vi) coherence following outcome 4_alternative 7 vs. coherence following outcome 
7 (Z= -3.67, p< 0.01); (vii) coherence following outcome 4_alternative 1 vs. coherence following 
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outcome 4_alternative 7 (Z= -2.46, p= 0.014). In particular, children seemed to be more coherent 
when they received advantageous outcomes than when they got unfavorable outcomes. 
The occurrence of switching behavior depended on the children’s choice outcomes 
(Friedman’s ANOVA: Chi Sqr.= 1091, p< 0.01): children switched their choice more often when 
they received 1 or 4 rewards rather than when they obtained 7 rewards (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: 
outcome 1 vs. 7: z= -2.67, p= 0.008; outcome 4 vs. 7: z= -4.08, p< 0.01; see Figure 14). 
 
 
 Figure 14. Probabilistic Choice Task: Switching behavior depending on the outcome of  
children’s choice 
 
 
There was no overall effect of condition on the frequency of switching (Kruskal Wallis 
ANOVA: H= 4,15, p= 0,13); however, children performed more switching in the Disadvantageous 
condition than in the Advantageous condition (Mann Whitney U test: Z= -1.94; p= 0.05; see Figure 
15). 
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Figure 15. Probabilistic Choice Task: Switching behavior in the three experimental conditions 
 
The correlations between the latency to choose and emotion 1 depending on the different 
outcome (1,4,7) were not significant (Spearman correlation: latency to choose and emotion 1 for 
outcome 1: rs= 0.04, N= 343, p= 0.50; latency to choose and emotion 1 for outcome 4: rs= 0.04, N= 
525, p= 0.06; latency to choose and emotion 1 for outcome 7: rs= 0.06, N= 327, p= 0.25). Also the 
correlations between the frequency of switching behavior and emotion 1 depending on the different 
outcomes were not significant (Spearman correlation: switching and emotion 1 following outcome 
1: rs= -0.004, N= 300, p= 0.94; switching and emotion 1 following outcome 4: rs= 0.03, N= 526, p= 
0.49; switching and emotion 1 following outcome 7: rs= 0.04, N= 282, p= 0.47).  
From the video analysis, five categories of children’s behavior after choice were identified: 
(i) waiting strategies (34%); (ii) positive expressions (9%); (iii) negative expressions (2%); (iv) self-
directed behavior (3%); (v) manipulation of experimental materials (43%) (as shown in Figure 16). 
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Figure 16. Probabilistic Choice Task: distribution of children’s behaviors after choice 
 
 
All of these behavioral categories were affected by the experimental condition: (i) children 
adopted waiting strategies less frequently in the Advantageous condition than in the Neutral and 
Disadvantageous conditions (Mann Whitney U test: Neutral vs. Advantageous: Z= -3.10, p= 0.002; 
Advantageous vs. Disadvantageous: Z= -2.44, p= 0.02); (ii) children showed positive expressions 
less frequently in the Disadvantageous condition than in the Neutral condition (Mann Whitney U 
test: Z= -2.29; p= 0.02); (iii) children showed more negative expressions in the Disadvantageous 
condition than in the Neutral condition (Mann Whitney U test: Z= -2.55, p= 0.01); (iv) children 
produced a lower number of self-directed behaviors in the Neutral condition than in the 
Advantageous and Disadvantageous conditions (Mann Whitney U test: Neutral vs. Advantageous: 
Z= -2.70, p= 0.007; Neutral vs. Disadvantageous: Z= -1.98, p= 0.05); (v) children manipulated the 
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experimental materials more in the Advantageous condition than in the Neutral condition (Mann 
Whitney U test: Z= -2.69, p= 0.007), and more in the Disadvantageous condition than in the 
Advantageous condition (Mann Whitney U test: Z= -2.32, p= 0.02).  
Finally, the waiting strategies were significant correlated with the outcome of children’s 
choice (Spearman correlation: rs= -0,089, N= 1112, p= 0,003): they employed these behaviors less 
when receiving seven rewards rather than one or four. Consistently, positive and negative 
expressions were correlated with the outcomes and the emotions indicated by children on the 5-
point rating scale (Spearman correlation: positive expressions and outcome: rs= 0.15, N= 1112, p< 
0.01; positive expressions and emotion 1: rs= 0.11, N= 1109, p< 0.01; negative expressions and 
outcome: rs= -0.23, N= 1112, p< 0.01; negative expressions and emotion 1: rs= -0.24, N= 1109, p< 
001).  
 
The role of previous outcome and emotional responses on children’s subsequent 
choices 
In order to evaluate the influence of the outcomes of previous choices on the subsequent 
decisions of children throughout the task, conditional fixed-effects logistic regression was 
performed.  
In the Neutral condition, children chose the risky option more after choosing the safe option 
than after choosing a risky option regardless of the outcome (1 or 7) (outcome 1 vs. outcome 4: z= -
9.25, p< 0.01, N= 79, number of observations= 703; outcome 7 vs. outcome 4: z= -11.06, p< 0.01, 
N= 79, number of observations= 703). Furthermore, they chose the risky option more after 
receiving outcome 1 than outcome 7 (outcome 7 vs. outcome 1: z= -2.93, p= 0.03, N= 79, number 
of observations= 703). In the Advantageous and Disadvantageous conditions, children chose the 
risky option more after choosing a safe option than after choosing a risky option, regardless of its 
outcome (1 or 7) (Advantageous condition: outcome 1 vs. outcome 4: z= -6.67, p< 0.01, N= 47, 
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number of observations= 403; outcome 7 vs. outcome 4: z= -8.12, p< 0.01, N= 47, number of 
observations= 403; Disadvantageous condition: outcome 1 vs. outcome 4: z= -6.54, p< 0.01, N= 50, 
number of observations= 434; outcome 7 vs. outcome 4: z= -4.67, p< 0.01, N= 50, number of 
observations= 434). There was no significant difference between choices after receiving outcome 1 
and outcome 7 (Advantageous condition: outcome 7 vs. outcome 1: z= -0.46, p= 0.64, N= 47, 
number of observations= 403; Disadvantageous condition: outcome 7 vs. outcome 1: z= -0.40, p= 
0.70, N= 50, number of observations= 434). 
In addition, it was analyzed whether the emotions indicated by children on the 5-point rating 
scale affected their subsequent decisions. In all conditions, children chose the risky option more 
when they felt sad about the outcome of their choice than when they declared to feel happy 
(Emotion 1: Neutral condition: very happy face vs. very sad face: Z= -3.33, p= 0.001, N= 29, 
number of observations= 255; happy face vs. very sad face: Z= -3.23, p= 0.001, N= 29, number of 
observations= 255; Advantageous condition: very happy face vs very sad face: Z= -2.46, p= 0.02, 
N= 43, number of observations= 377; happy face vs. very sad face: Z= -4.22, p< 0.001 N= 43, 
number of observations= 377; Disadvantageous condition: very happy face vs. very sad face: Z= -
3.57, p< 0.01, N= 45, number of observations= 404; happy face vs. very sad face: Z= -3.27, p= 
0.001, N= 45, number of observations= 404), whereas the emotions expressed after seeing the 
alternative option (emotion 2) did not affect the children’s subsequent decisions. 
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 3.6.2 The Children’s Gambling Task 
 The Children's Gambling Task was administered to 111 children (22 four-year-olds, 33 5-
year-olds, 50 six-seven-eight-year-olds; 51 males and 54 females); six of them did not select a 
minimum of 45 cards, therefore their data were excluded from statistical analysis.  
 For each block, the analysis of the distribution of data was performed using the Shapiro-
Wilk Test. The data were not normally distributed (block 1: W = 0.93, p< 0.01; block 2: W = 0.92, 
p< 0.01; block 3: W = 0.95, p< 0.01; block4: W = 0.93, p< 0.01; block 5: W = 0.94, p< 0.01).  
The environment where the experiment was carried out did not affect children’s choices 
(Kruskal Wallis ANOVA: block 1: H (2, N = 105) = 3.34, p = 0.19; block 2: H (2, N = 105) = 1.44, 
p = 0.49; block 3: H (2, N = 105) = 0.19,  p = 0.91; block 4: H (2, N = 105) = 1.12, p = 0.57; block 
5: H (2, N = 105) = 1.42, p = 049). Gender did not affect children’s choices as well (Mann Whitney 
U test: block 1: Z = -0.07, N= 105, p = 0.94; block 2: Z = -1.12, N= 105, p = 0.27; block 3: Z = -
0.31, N= 105, p = 0.75; block 4: Z = -0.24, N= 105, p = 0.81; block 5: Z = -0.73, N= 105, p = 0.47). 
Age affected children’s performance, in that in the first block 5-year-old children selected more 
cards from the advantageous deck than 6-7-8-year-olds (Mann Whitney U test: N= 83, Z = -2.33, p 
= 0.02), whereas for the other blocks this effect was not significant. 
Although there were significant correlations between all blocks (Table 4), there was a 
marginally significant difference in performance among blocks of trials (Friedman's ANOVA: Chi 
Sqr. (N = 105, df = 4) = 9.05, p = 0.06). Wilcoxon post-hoc tests highlighted a significant difference 
between block 2 and blocks 3 and 4: children selected more cards from the disadvantageous deck in 
block 2 than in blocks 3 and 4, as shown in Figure 17 (block 1 vs. block 2: N = 105, z = -1.07, p = 
0.29; bock 1 vs. block 3: N = 105, z = -1.04, p = 0.30; block 1 vs. block 4: N = 105, z = -1.39, p = 
0,17; block 1 vs. block 5: N = 105, z = -1.19, p = 0.23; block 2 vs. block 3: N = 105, z = -2.30, p = 
0.02; block 2 vs. block 4: N = 105, z = -2.24, p = 0.02; block 2 vs. block 5: N = 105, z = -1.84, p = 
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0.07; block 3 vs. block 4: N = 105, z = -0.16, p = 0.87; block 3 vs. block 5: N= 105, z = 0.03, p = 
0.98; block4 vs. block 5: N= 105, z = -0.48, p = 0.63).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. The Children’s Gambling Task: Trend of choices throughout the Children’s  
Gambling Task. 
 
 
  Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 4 
rs Spearman Block 1 Coefficient 
 
.439** 401** .492** .376** 
Significance   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 
 
105 105 105 105 
Block 2 Coefficient .439** 
 
.749** .672** .424** 
Significance 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 105 
 
105 105 105 
Block 3 Coefficient .401** .749** 
 
.735** .504** 
Significance 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
N 105 105 
 
105 105 
Block 4 Coefficient .492** .672** .735** 
 
.564** 
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 
N 105 105 105 
 
105 
Block 5 Coefficient .376** .424** .504** .564** 
 
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
N 105 105 105 105 
 
**p= 0.01  
 
Table 4. The Children’s Gambling Task: Spearman correlations between blocks 
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 3.6.3 The Bet Task 
 The Bet Task was administered to 127 children (33 four-year-olds, 40 five-year-olds, 54 six-
seven-eight-year-olds, 62 males and 65 females).  
Analysis of data distribution was carried out using the Shapiro-Wilk Test, which showed that data 
were not normally distributed (W = 0.67, p< 0.01). As for the other tasks, the environment in which 
the experiment was carried out and gender did not affect children’s performance (Kruskal Wallis 
ANOVA: environment: H (2, N = 127) = 3.76, p = 0.15, Mann Whitney U test: block 1: Casa dei 
Bambini vs. Istituto Valente: Z= -1.77, N1=41, N2= 47, p= 0.08; Casa dei Bambini vs. laboratory: 
Z= -0.43, N1=41, N2= 17, p= 0.67; Istituto Valente vs. laboratory: Z= -0.99, N1=47, N2= 17, p= 
0.32; block 2: Casa dei Bambini vs. Istituto Valente: Z= -0.55, N1=41, N2= 47, p= 0.56; Casa dei 
Bambini vs. laboratory: Z= -0.70, N1=41, N2= 17, p= 0.49; Istituto Valente vs. laboratory: Z= -1.23, 
N1=47, N2= 17, p= 0.22; block 3: Casa dei Bambini vs. Istituto Valente: Z= -0.35, N1=41, N2= 47, 
p= 0.72; Casa dei Bambini vs. laboratory: Z= -0.38, N1=41, N2= 17, p= 0.71; Istituto Valente vs. 
laboratory: Z= -0.08, N1=47, N2= 17, p= 0.93; block 4: Casa dei Bambini vs. Istituto Valente: Z= -
0.07, N1=41, N2= 47, p= 0.94; Casa dei Bambini vs. laboratory: Z= -1.06, N1=41, N2= 17, p= 0.29; 
Istituto Valente vs. laboratory: Z= -0.90, N1=47, N2= 17, p= 0.37; block 5: Casa dei Bambini vs. 
Istituto Valente: Z= -0.30, N1=41, N2= 47, p= 0.76; Casa dei Bambini vs. laboratory: Z= -0.99, 
N1=41, N2= 17, p= 0.32; Istituto Valente vs. laboratory: Z= -1.14, N1=47, N2= 17, p= 0.25; Mann 
Whitney U test: gender: Z= -0,30, N= 127, p= 0,77), whereas there was a marginally significant 
effect of age on the percentage of tosses performed (Kruskal Wallis: H (2, N = 127) = 5.51, p = 
0.06). The oldest group of children decided to bet more frequently than 5-year-olds, whereas there 
were no significant differences between the other age groups (Mann Whitney U test: 4-year-olds vs. 
5-year-olds: Z= -0.07, N1= 33, N2= 40, p= 0.48; 4-year-olds vs. 6-7-8-year-olds: Z= -1.43, N1= 33, 
N2= 54, p= 0.15; 5-year-olds vs. 6-7-8-year-olds: Z= -2.32, N1= 40, N2= 54, p= 0.02; see Figure 18). 
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There was no significant correlation between the percentage of tosses performed and the winning 
frequency (rs = 0.08, N = 127, p = 0.40). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. The Bet Task: Percentage of trials completed depending on age. 
 
 
Evaluation of emotional correlates 
 The outcome of children’s throws significantly affect the coherence of their responses to the 
5-point rating scale (Friedman’s ANOVA: Chi Sqr.= 183,19, p< 0,01). Specifically, children were 
more coherent when they won the bet compared to when they lost it (Figure 19). 
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Figure 19. The Bet Task: Coherence of children responses to the 5-point rating scale according to  
the outcome of their bet 
 
 
 After the outcome of the coin toss, the same categories of behaviors scored in the 
Probabilistic Choice Task were identified (waiting strategies 39%, positive expressions 29%, 
negative expressions 12%, self-directed behaviors 3%, manipulation of experimental material 49%). 
When winning, children exhibited more waiting strategies, positive expressions and manipulation of 
experimental material than when losing (Mann Whitney U test: waiting strategies: Z= -4.61, p< 
0.01; positive expressions: Z= -12.35; p< 0.01; manipulation of experimental material: Z= -3.75, p< 
0.01).  
  
3.6.4 Correlations between different tasks 
The relation between performance in the Probabilistic Choice Task, the Children Gambling 
Task and the Bet Task was assessed. Specifically, I calculated the correlation between the 
proportion of choice of the risky option and the choices made by children in each CGT block, by 
controlling for age, BIN 4-6 battery total score, and Peabody Test standardized score in each 
condition of the Probabilistic Choice Task (see Tables 5, 6, 7). 
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Table 5. Partial correlation between the frequency of choice of the risky option and each  
block of the CGT by controlling for age. Significant correlations are indicated in bold type. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Partial correlation between the frequency of choice of the risky option and each  
block of the CGT by checking for the total score obtained in the BIN 4-6 battery. 
 Advantageous Neutral Disadvantageous 
Block 1 r=0.41 p=0.01 
N=37 
r=0.02 p=0.93 
N=23 
r=0.07 p=0.65 
N=36 
Block 2 r=0.26 p=0.11 
N=37 
r=-0.17 p=0.43 
N=23 
r=-0.14 p=0.39 
N=36 
Block 3 r=0.10  p=0.53 
N=37 
r=0.20 p=0.35 
N=23 
r=-0.18 p=0.29 
N=36 
Block 4 r=0.14 p=0.39 
N=37 
r=-0.03 p=0.89 
N=23 
r=-0.13 p=0.45 
N=36 
Block 5 r=0.13 p=0.45 
N=37 
r=-0.06 p=0.77 
N=23 
r=-0.26 p=0.11 
N=36 
 Advantageous Neutral Disadvantageous 
Block 1 r=0.34 p=0.05 
N=32 
r=0.23 p=0.31 
N=20 
r=-0.02 p=0.91 
N=35 
Block 2 r=0.31 p=0.08 
N=32 
r=-0.05 p=0.81 
N=20 
r=-0.15 p=0.39 
N=35 
Block 3 r=0.20  p=0.25 
N=32 
r=0.27 p=0.23 
N=20 
r=-0.28 p=0.09 
N=35 
Block 4 r=0.18 p=0.30 
N=32 
r=0.01  p=0.97 
N=20 
r=-0.18 p=0.29 
N=35 
Block 5 r=0.11 p=0.56 
N=32 
r=-0.01 p=0.98 
N=20 
r=-0.31 p=0.06 
N=35 
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Table 7: Partial correlation between the frequency of choice of the risky option and  
each block of the CGT by checking for the total score obtained in the BIN 4-6 battery. 
 
Moreover, the correlation between the proportion of choice of the risky option in each 
condition of the Probabilistic Choice Task and the percentage of tosses realized in the Bet Task was 
not significant (Neutral condition: rs= 0.03, p= 0.87, N= 27; Disadvantageous condition: rs= 0.21, 
p= 0.13, N= 51; Advantageous condition: rs= 0.05, p= 0.71, N= 49). There relations were not 
significant even when controlling for age, total score obtained in the BIN 4-6 battery and the 
standardized score obtained in the Peabody Test (see Table 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 Advantageous Neutral Disadvantageous 
Block 1 r=0.42 p=0.008 
N=36 
r=0.19 p=0.37 
N=22 
r=0.05 p=0.79 
N=36 
Block 2 r=0.24 p=0.14 
N=36 
r=0.02 p=0.94 
N=22 
r=-0.13 p=0.45 
N=36 
Block 3 r=0.05  p=0.76 
N=36 
r=0.28 p=0.19 
N=22 
r=-0.25 p=0.13 
N=36 
Block 4 r=0.11 p=0.52 
N=36 
r=0.09  p=0.69 
N=22 
r=-0.17 p=0.32 
N=36 
Block 5 r=0.09 p=0.61 
N=36 
r=0.05 p=0.82 
N=22 
r=-0.29 p=0. 
08 N=36 
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Table 8: Partial correlations between the percentage of trials completed in the Bet Task  
and the proportion of choices of the risky option in each condition of the Probabilistic  
Choice Task by controlling for age, the total score obtained in the BIN 4-6 battery and  
the standardized score obtained at the Peabody Test. 
 
 Similarly, no significant correlation emerged between performance in each block of the 
Children’s Gambling Task and the percentage of tosses performed in the Bet Task (see Table 9). 
 
Table 9. Correlations between the percentage of tosses performed in the Bet Task and children’s 
performance in each block of the CGT.  
  
 
 Age BIN 4-6 battery Peabody Test 
Neutral r=0.09 p=0.66 
N=24 
r=0.15 p=0.47 
N=23 
r=-0.03 p=0.91 
N=21 
Advantageous r=0.08 p=0.57 
N=46 
r=0.07 p=0.66 
N=45 
r=0.03 p=0.85 
N=39 
Disadvantageous r=0.15  p=0.30 
N=48 
r=0.14 p=0.32 
N=48 
r=0.22 p=0.13 
N=47 
   Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 
percentage 
of tosses 
performed 
 
rs  
Spearman 
Coefficient 
Block 1 
Coefficient    .439** .401** .492** .376** -0.072  
Significance    0.000 0.000 0,000 0,000 0.472  
N   105 105 105 105 103  
Block 2 
Coefficient   .439**  .749** .672** .424** 0.106  
Significance  0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.285  
N  105  105 105 105 103  
Block 3 
Coefficient   .401** .749**  .735** .504** 0.013  
Significance  0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.899  
N  105 105  105 105 103  
Block 4 
Coefficient   .492** .672** .735**  .564** -0.115  
Significance  0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.246  
N  105 105 105  105 103  
Block 5 
Coefficient   .376** .424** .504** .564**  -0.071  
Significance  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0,475  
N  105 105 105 105  103  
percentage 
of tosses 
performed 
Coefficient   -0.072 0.106 0.013 -0.115 -0.071   
Significance  0.472 0.285 0.899 0.246 0.475    
N  103 103 103 103 103   
**. p= 0.01   
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 The total score obtained in the BIN 4-6 battery was affected by age (Kruskal Wallis: H (2, 
N= 179)= 91.90, p< 0.01). In particular, 6-7-8 years old children performed better than 4- and 5-
year-olds, and the 5-year-old children performed better than 4-year-olds (Mann Whitney U test: 4-
year-olds vs. 5-year-olds: Z= -6.22, N1= 58, N2= 64, p< 0.01; 4-year-olds vs. 6-7-8-year-olds: Z= -
8.45, N1= 58, N2= 57, p< 0.01; 5-year-olds vs. 6-7-8-year-olds Z= -5.67, N1= 64, N2= 57, p< 0.01). 
 When controlling for age, there were no significant correlations between children’s 
performances in the Children’s Gambling Task and in the Bet Task, respectively, and the scores 
obtained in the BIN 4-6 battery (partial correlation: CGT: block 1: rs= 0.04, N= 93, p= 0.72; block 2: 
rs= -0.10, N= 93, p= 0.32; block 3: rs= -0.08, N= 93, p= 0.46; block 4: rs= -0.06, N= 93, p= 0.55; block 
5: rs= -0.14, N= 93, p= 0.18. Bet Task: rs= 0.02, N= 113, p= 0.82). In contrast, the proportion of choice 
of the risky option in each condition of the Probabilistic Choice Task was related with some areas of 
the BIN 4-6 battery, when controlling for age. In particular, in the Neutral condition the proportion of 
choice of the risky option was significant correlated with children’s performance in the Lexical area 
(partial correlation: rs= 0.23, N= 73, p= 0.046), in the Advantageous condition it was correlated with 
children’s performance in the Pre-syntactic area (partial correlation: rs= 0.38, N= 43, p= 0.01), and in 
the Disadvantageous condition it was correlated with children’s performance in the Counting area 
(partial correlation: rs= 0.29, N= 47, p= 0.043). Furthermore, the two awareness questions were 
correlated with the scores obtained in the BIN 4-6 battery (see table 10).  
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Table 10. Partial correlations between the two awareness questions and the scores obtained in the BIN 4-6 
battery. 
 
 
Conversely, children’s performances in the three gambling tasks did not correlate with the 
standard score obtained in The Peabody Test (Probabilistic Choice Task: rs= 0.04, N= 165, p= 0.59; 
CGT: block 1: rs= -0.02, N= 96, p= 0.85; block 2: rs= -0.11, N= 96, p= 0.27; block 3: rs= -0.04, N= 96, 
p= 0.67; block 4: rs= -0.07, N= 96, p= 0.50; block 5: rs= -0.11, N= 96, p= 0.28; Bet Task: rs= 0.001, 
N= 116, p= 0.99). 
 
3.6.5 Thermal data results 
The performance in the Probabilistic Choice Task of a sample of 15 children (4 five-year-
olds, 6 six-year-olds, 2 seven-year-olds, 3 eight-year-olds; 7 males and 8 females) was recorded by 
using an infrared thermal camera. Eight children were tested in the Disadvantageous condition and 7 
children were tested in the Advantageous condition.  
To assess whether the slope of the thermal signal  was affected by phase (phase 1, phase 2 and 
phase 3 which constituted the task, see paragraph 3.4.2), outcome (1, 4, 7), alternative option (1, 4, 7), 
and trial number a fixed-effects within-subject regression was performed. There were no significant 
interactions between outcome and phase (F(4, 396)= 0.37, p= 0.83) and between alternative option and 
phase (F(4, 396)= 0.33, p= 0.86). None of the variables of interest affected the slope of the thermal 
 First awareness 
question* 
Second awareness 
question * 
Total score of the lexical area 0,44  p< 0,01 0,58   p< 0,01 
Total score of the semantic area 0,43   p< 0,01 0,58   p< 0,01 
Total score of the counting area 0,45   p< 0,01 0,62   p< 0,01 
Total score of the pre-syntactical 
area 
0,44   p< 0,01 0,63   p< 0,01 
Total score of BIN battery 0,46   p< 0,01 0,63   p< 0,01 
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signal during the task (phase 1 vs. phase 2: t= 0.92, p= 0.36; phase 1 vs. phase 3: t= 0.04, p= 0.97; 
phase 2 vs. phase 3: t= -0.88, p= 0.38. Outcome 1 vs. outcome 4: t= -1.22, p= 0.23; outcome 1 vs. 
outcome 7: t= -0.35, p= 0.73; outcome 4 vs. outcome 7: t= 1.10, p= 0.27. Alternative option 1 vs. 
alternative option 4: t= -0.33, p= 0.74; alternative option 1 vs. alternative option 7: t= -0.16, p= 0.86; 
alternative option 4 vs. alternative option 7: t= 0.22, p= 0.82. Trial: t= -1.61, p= 0.10). 
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Chapter Four - Discussion 
 The aim of the present study was to assess preschool and school age children’s preferences 
in the context of uncertainty and to evaluate their ability to make advantageous decisions in risky 
situations. 
To this purpose, 183 children from age four to eight years were administered a battery of 
tasks, including three gambling tasks: the Probabilistic Choice Task, The Children’s Gambling Task 
and the Bet Task. In the Probabilistic Choice Task, children faced a series of choices between a safe 
option, yielding always four rewards, and a risky option, yielding either one or seven rewards with 
different probabilities, according to the experimental condition. Overall, children preferred more the 
risky option in the Advantageous condition, in which the probability to get the larger reward was 
higher than in the other two conditions. Thus, it seems that children were able to make 
advantageous choices, by taking into account the probabilities of the different outcome of their 
decisions. This result is in line with previous findings which provided evidence in favor of a 
functional understanding of probability and expected value in young children (Schlottmann and 
Anderson 1994, Harbaugh et al. 2002). In this sample, five years old children significantly preferred 
the risky option in the Advantageous condition and significantly preferred the same option in the 
Disadvantageous condition, whereas the same did not hold true for four- and six-seven-eight-year-
olds. These data are consistent with  previous findings which highlighted an improvement with age 
in the ability to make advantageous choices in gambling tasks, also depending on the neural 
maturation, which gradually continues in the course of development (Crone et al., 2005, 2007; 
Bunch et al., 2007 Gao et al., 2009; Steelandt et al., 2013). However, surprisingly, in this sample 
older children did not utilize the same maximizing strategy as the five-year-olds. This result cannot 
be explained by a lack of comprehension of the task, since, six, seven and eight years old children 
gave more correct answers to both awareness questions compared to the youngest children. This 
difference was possibly due to other factors that characterized the two groups. Indeed, analyzing the 
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level of education of their parents, a significant difference between the two groups emerged: the 
level of education of the parents of six-seven-eight-year-olds was lower than the one of the five 
years old children’s parents, and it is known that the level of education and the socio-economic 
origin are inversely proportional to the commitment to gambling activities (as reviewed in 
Serpelloni, 2013, and Bastiani et al., 2013). Another explanation of our result could be that older 
children were more involved in gambling activities during daily routines. While parents tend to 
monitor and prevent preschoolers from using tablets and smartphones, in the transition from 
preschool to elementary school children have more opportunities to be involved with their peers in 
these attractive activities, without the adults’ supervision. The advent of the internet and new digital 
technologies has undoubtedly made gambling activities more accessible, bringing them closer to a 
public generally far away from gaming rooms, such as children. In particular, online gambling 
offers extremely exciting and engaging graphics and messages, attracting a very young target: a 
survey conducted by Datanalysis and presented to the “International pediatric congress on 
environment, nutrition and skin diseases” in 2014, reports that about 400,000 children between 
seven and nine years old have already been introduced in the world of instant lotteries, sports 
betting and online gambling by parents, relatives or friends. Recently, the so-called "ticket 
redemption", the slot machine for children, is becoming increasingly popular. The game consists in 
inserting a coin, pushing a button, shooting at a target and trying to win a "ticket". More tickets are 
accumulated, more precious is the prize that can be withdrawn (e.g. Ipad, ultimate Mp3, cell 
phones, wristwatches, toy cars, dolls, necklaces and bracelets). Although they differ from adult 
gambling due to some features such as the lack of money-making (which makes these slot machines 
perfectly legal) and the implication of a certain degree of skill in acquiring tickets, the "ticket 
redemption" have remarkable similarities with classic slot machines for the game dynamics and for 
the presence of a prize; hence, it is likely to experience frustration when not receiving any reward, 
despite the commitment and the money paid, losing the playful aspect of the game. It is possible 
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that the older children in the current study were more engaged and more familiar with the dynamics 
of gambling than the preschool children, as shown by the fact that in the Bet Task they decided to 
bet significantly more than five-year-olds. Moreover, older children were also less sensitive to 
disparities in the reward outcome: in particular, in the Neutral and Disadvantageous conditions, in 
which the probabilities to get only one reward were higher than in the Advantageous condition, 
children less sensitive to rewards chose significantly more the risky option than children with a high 
reward sensitivity index.  
However, based on the optimal decisions made by five-year-olds, it might be hypothesized 
that their probabilistic reasoning skills were overestimated, relying on classical theories on the 
development of the concept of probability, which declared that young children do not understand 
the concept of chance and that they are not able to reason in probabilistic terms before the age of 
seven (Piaget & Inhelder, 1975). However, several studies showed that five years old children made 
optimal decisions in probabilistic tasks, in which they had to evaluate the chances of two 
alternatives (Reyna & Brainerd, 1994; Girotto, Fontanari, Gonzalez, Vallortigara & Blaye, 2016). 
Among factors that could explain conflicting evidences in the literature, Girotto et al. (2016) 
enumerate task complexity, limits in inhibitory control at different ages, implicit versus explicit 
understanding of probabilities and the idea that the development of probability understanding may 
not follow a linear trajectory. Thus, according to these more recent evidences, the difference found 
in the current study between five-year-olds and older children should be better investigated and 
further studies are needed to extensively investigate the emergence and the development of this 
important but neglected ability.  
The lack of correlation between the proportion of choice of the risky option and the two 
awareness questions was probably due to the fact that the two dependent variables considered 
require two different types of processes: implicit understanding of the task when choosing between 
the two conflicting options and explicit understanding of it when answering to the two awareness 
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questions. It may be expected that these two levels of understanding interact later in development, 
as a difficulty in metacognitive reasoning on the maladaptive choices has been documented in adult 
pathological gamblers (Brevers et al., 2012). 
As for the analysis of the emotional correlates using the Weisberg and Beck’s (2011) 5-point 
rating scale, when considering the whole sample children reported their emotions coherently with 
the outcomes of their choices, confirming the reliability of this measure. Children’s emotions were 
affected by choice outcomes and experimental conditions. Moreover, adopting waiting strategies 
seemed to help children to tolerate the frustration of unfavorable outcomes, since these behaviors 
occurred significantly more often when children won only one reward and in the Disadvantageous 
condition than in the Advantageous condition. As for adults and some non-human primates (Troisi, 
2002), implementing this kind of activities could help children to cope with stressful situations, and 
these behaviors could also be the expression of a negative emotion, such as frustration, following an 
unfavorable outcome (Pecora, Addessi, Schino & Bellagamba, 2014).  
Furthermore, in all three conditions, children chose significantly more the risky option after 
choosing a safe option, than after choosing a risky option. Only in the Neutral condition, children 
preferred to choose the risky option after receiving only one reward than when they won seven 
rewards. This result could be related to the characteristics of the condition itself, in which the two 
alternatives (one or seven rewards), linked to the choice of the risky option, had the same 
probability to occur. Even in this case, children might have reasoned in probabilistic terms by 
implementing a "loss-stay" strategy, expecting the larger reward after receiving an unfavorable 
outcome. Otherwise, this result could also be explained in terms of perseverative errors, in 
agreement with previous findings which showed that children are less able to shift their decision’s 
strategy after a negative feedback than adolescents and adults (Crone, Somsen, Zanolie & van der 
Molen, 2006). 
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Emotional responses affected children’s subsequent choices. Children preferred to choose 
the risky option more when they reported to feel sad or very sad about the outcome of their previous 
choice. However, the emotions declared after seeing the unchosen option did not affect children’s 
subsequent decisions. Thus, it seems that children did not experience regret about their choices, 
focusing their attention only on what they have won and not on what they could have received. This 
may be due to the fact that this task did not imply losses that could cause a feeling of regret in 
children. This interpretation is also coherent with the thermal data analysis. The lack of a loss could 
have made this task not salient enough at the emotional level, since there was no variation in 
sympathetic activation following the outcomes of the choices made by the children during the task 
compared to the baseline. 
In the Children’s Gambling Task, children appeared to adopt a choice’s strategy, that they 
maintained throughout the test, since the performance in the five blocks of trials were positively 
correlated with each other. Overall, the trend of choices throughout the blocks resulted 
advantageous. Once again, the five-year-olds, already from the first block, were able to select more 
cards from the advantageous deck than the older children.  
In the Bet Task, as mentioned above, six-seven-eight-year-olds decided to bet more often 
than five years old children, and overall children’s will to bet was not affected by the frequency of 
winning. The coherence of emotional responses differed between the events of wins or losses. 
When winning, children gave more coherent responses than when loosing. It might be hypothesized 
that the lower coherence of responses following a loss was due to coping strategies that children 
used to conceal the presence of a negative feeling caused by the loss of their rewards, so that they 
hid their frustration declaring to feel happy anyway (Manstead, 1995; Cole, 1986); thus, in future 
studies, it would be interesting to analyze their emotional reactions also at a physiological level by 
means of infrared thermography.  
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In relation to linguistic and mathematical reasoning, our results show that children’s 
performances in the three gambling task was not affected by their level of linguistic understanding; 
whereas some of their numerical skills were positively correlated with the proportion of choice of 
the risky option in the Probabilistic Choice Task. Interestingly, the answers to the two awareness 
questions were related with the scores obtained in the different areas investigated by the BIN 4-6 
battery, highlighting the key role of numerical skills in the comprehension of the task. Children that 
gave more correct answers to these questions were also those that demonstrated better numerical 
reasoning skills. Although the abilities evaluated by this battery were not as sophisticated as 
probabilistic reasoning, they constituted an essential prerequisite for understanding and achieving 
success in the Probabilistic Choice Task. 
Finally, the lack of correlation between the three different gambling tasks (with the only 
exception of the correlation between the first block of the CGT and the proportion of risky choices 
in the advantageous condition of the Probabilistic Choice Task) might suggest that these tasks 
investigate different aspects of risk propensity, confirming that it is a multi-faceted and multi-
dimensional construct. 
In future studies, it would be important to deepen the analysis of emotional responses 
through infrared thermography, by expanding the sample and by performing an individual analysis 
of children's performance in a choice task. In addition, in order to have a more complete picture of 
children’s decision-making under risk, it would be recommended to integrate the experimental 
procedure with other tools, such as questionnaires to evaluate the emotional-adaptive functioning of 
children and of their parents. 
The evidence provided by various authors in favor of an early development of risk 
propensity suggests important future clinical and educational applications. Further developmental 
research highlighting both cognitive and emotional mechanisms and processes involved in decision-
making under risk may be helpful to identify strategies and biases in subjects prone to engaging in 
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risky behaviors that may eventually lead to future behavioral disorders and diseases (as pathological 
gambling), thus allowing the development of early intervention programs. Given the premature 
involvement of children in gambling activities, prevention acquires a key role: selective prevention, 
especially aimed at children, is particularly effective, allowing early detection of vulnerability and 
potentially risky behaviors, permitting focused intervention programs (Serpelloni, 2013). To plan 
prevention actions, it will be crucial to fully understand  factors and mechanisms underlying risk 
propensity. Thus, it is important to keep exploring this topic since early childhood, hopefully with a 
multidisciplinary approach that manages to combine different experimental methods in order to 
achieve solid results.  
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